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Abstract 
Intelligent Systems for Information Security 
Ayman Mohammad Bahaa Eldin Sadeq Albassal 
Doctor of Philosophy dissertation 
Ain Shams University, 2004 
This thesis aims to use intelligent systems to extend and improve 
performance and security of cryptographic techniques as the 
cryptographic techniques are the main mechanisms used in information 
security. Information security goals and objectives are first studied then a 
historical background of cryptology is given. Focus is then turned into 
symmetric block ciphers. The design principles and how to measure a 
cipher security is then studied. Several examples of modern block ciphers 
are given. Cryptanalysis techniques and how they are classified are 
described. Details about differential cryptanalysis and interpolation 
cryptanalysis are presented. Genetic algorithms framework for 
cryptanalysis problem is addressed.  
A novel extension to the differential cryptanalysis using genetic algorithm 
is proposed and a fitness measure based on the differential characteristics 
of the cipher being attacked is also proposed. The complexity of the 
proposed attack is shown to be less than quarter of normal differential 
cryptanalysis of the same cipher by applying the proposed attack to both 
the basic Substitution Permutation Network and the Feistel Network. The 
basic models of modern block ciphers are attacked instead of actual 
cipher to prove that the attack is applicable to other ciphers vulnerable to 
differential cryptanalysis. 
A new attack for block cipher based on the ability of neural networks to 
perform an approximation of mapping is proposed. A complete problem 
formulation is explained and implementation of the attack on some 
hypothetical Feistel cipher not vulnerable to differential or linear attacks 
is presented.  
A new block cipher based on the neural networks is proposed. A complete 
cipher structure is given and a key scheduling is also shown. The main 
properties of neural network being able to perform mapping between 
large dimension domains in a very fast and a very small memory 
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compared to S-Boxes is used as a base for the cipher. A fully connected 
structure is also used to produce large confusion and diffusion effects. 
Two key dependent schemes are presented and compared. 
All proposals are assessed by several experimentation and selected tests 
and test results are presented. 
 
Keywords: 
Information Security, Cryptography, Cryptanalysis, Cryptology, 
Symmetric Block Cipher, Differential Cryptanalysis, Interpolation 
Cryptanalysis, Genetic Algorithms, Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithm 
Cryptanalysis, Neural Network Cryptanalysis, Neural network based 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
nformation security has always been a concern since old times. 
Secret talking was a key concept in ancient and modern wars.  
In recent days, information security is needed in most commercial 
and legal operations performed in a modern society. Information security 
tools and practices change in many ways according to the situation and 
requirements. Information security can be categorized by the goals to be 
achieved during a transaction or a transmission.  
The study of information security involves the study of security services, 
mechanisms, and attacks. Information security services are detailed in 
section 1.1, while a set of attacks especially on block ciphers are studied, 
and actually improved through novel proposals, given in the next chapters 
of the thesis. A mechanism is a means, a method or a system that is 
designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack. There is no 
single mechanism that will support all security goals required; however 
one particular element underlies many of the security mechanisms in use 
namely cryptographic techniques. 
Cryptography is a Greek word that is composed of two halves, kryptos 
and graphein.  The first word, kryptos, means hidden or secret and the 
other word, graphein, means writing. So cryptography means secret 
writing. As mentioned, cryptographic techniques are the most important 
mechanisms to achieve information security goals. This thesis focuses on 
the study of cryptography and cryptanalysis that make together the 
science of cryptology. The thesis goal is to propose new techniques using 
artificial intelligence to extend the cryptology mechanisms and to 
overcome some limitations in the classical approaches. This chapter gives 
a general introduction to the concepts of information security and 
cryptography. Then the objective and motivations of the thesis and also 
I 
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the methodologies used in the novel proposals of the thesis are given. 
Finally the structure of the thesis is outlined. 
1.1 Cryptography and Information Security 
Regardless of who is involved, to one degree or another, all parties to a 
transaction involving some information or raw data must have confidence 
that certain objectives associated with information security have been met 
[1]. Table 1.1 presents some possible goals, or security services, which 
may be involved in a secured information processing [1]. It can be noticed 
that information security involves many goals and hence a huge number 
of techniques, polices, procedures and mathematics are typically used to 
achieve such goals.  
Over the centuries, an elaborate set of protocols and mechanisms has been 
created to deal with information security issues when the information is 
conveyed by physical documents. Often the objectives of information 
security cannot solely be achieved through mathematical algorithms and 
protocols alone, but require procedural techniques and obedience of laws 
to achieve the desired result. 
For example, privacy of letters is provided by sealed envelopes delivered 
by an accepted mail service. The physical security of the envelope is, for 
practical necessity, limited and so laws are enforced which make it a 
criminal activity to open mail for which one is not authorized. It is 
sometimes the case that security is achieved not through the information 
itself but through the physical document recording it. For example, paper 
currency requires special inks and material to prevent counterfeiting [1]. 
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Table 1.1: Some information security objectives 
Privacy or confidentiality Keeping information secret from all but those who 
are authorized to see it. 
Data integrity Ensuring information has not been altered by 
unauthorized or unknown means. 
Entity authentication or 
identification 
Corroboration of the identity of an entity (e.g., a 
person, a computer terminal, a credit card, etc.). 
Message authentication Corroborating the source of information; also 
known as data origin authentication. 
Signature A means to bind information to an entity 
authorization 
Validation A means to provide timeliness of authorization to 
use or manipulate information. 
Access control Restricting access to resources to privileged 
entities. 
Certification Endorsement of information by a trusted entity. 
Time stamping Recording the time of creation or existence of 
information. 
Witnessing Verifying the creation or existence of information 
by an entity other than the creator. 
Receipt Acknowledgement that information has been 
received. 
Confirmation Acknowledgement that services have been 
provided. 
Ownership A means to provide an entity with the legal right 
to use or transfer a resource to others. 
Anonymity Concealing the identity of an entity involved in 
some process. 
non-repudiation Preventing the denial of previous commitments or 
actions. 
Revocation Retraction of certification or authorization. 
Most of the information security methods can be classified into two main 
categories 
1. Carrying, or transmission, medium related methods  
2. Information related methods 
While the former methods were widely used until recent days, the later 
methods are the modern ways for information security. 
It has been a great turn in information security techniques when the 
physical medium carrying the information changed from visual media, 
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like stones, leather tissues and papers to electronic media. Much of 
information now resides on magnetic media and is transmitted via 
telecommunications systems, some are wireless. 
What has changed dramatically is the ability to copy and alter 
information. One can make thousands of identical copies of a piece of 
information stored electronically and each is indistinguishable from the 
original. With information on paper, this is much more difficult. What is 
needed then where information is mostly stored and transmitted in 
electronic form is a means to ensure information security which is 
independent of the physical medium recording or conveying it and such 
that the objectives of information security rely solely on digital 
information itself [1]. 
Among all information security methods and techniques, cryptography is 
always the most powerful and widely used in most application. 
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects 
of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity 
authentication, and data origin authentication, and non-repudiation [2] 
and [1]. 
The previous definition involved 4 of the main services provided by 
information security systems and hence desire detailed definition rather 
than the short one presented in table 1.1. The definitions of these four 
terms are also taken form [1] 
1. Confidentiality is a service used to keep the content of information 
from all but those authorized to have it. Secrecy is a term 
synonymous with confidentiality and privacy. Secrecy means the 
information is not generally known, it may not involve 
authorization for access, and this term is hence not widely known. 
Privacy means to keep the information secret from all but the 
source of it. There are numerous approaches to providing 
confidentiality, ranging from physical protection to mathematical 
algorithms which render data non interpretable. 
2. Data integrity is a service which addresses the unauthorized 
alteration of data. To assure data integrity, one must have the 
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ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorized parties. Data 
manipulation includes such things as insertion, deletion, and 
substitution. 
3. Authentication is a service related to identification. This function 
applies to both entities and information itself. Two parties entering 
into a communication should identify each other. Information 
delivered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, date 
of origin, data content, time sent, etc. For these reasons this aspect 
of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major classes: 
entity authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin 
authentication implicitly provides data integrity. 
4. Non-repudiation is a service which prevents an entity from 
denying previous commitments or actions. When disputes arise 
due to an entity denying that certain actions were taken, a means 
to resolve the situation is necessary. For example, one entity may 
authorize the purchase of property by another entity and later deny 
such authorization was granted. A procedure involving a trusted 
third party is needed to resolve the dispute. 
The other services mentioned in table 1.1 depend on these basic four 
services. The information security services concept has been standardized 
in the ITU-T X.800 Security Architecture for OSI. The X.800 standard 
defines services, mechanisms and attacks. Security service is defined as a 
service provided by a protocol layer of communicating open systems, 
which ensures adequate security of the systems of data transfer [2]. 
The X.800 adds another basic service other than the mentioned four that 
is Access Control which can be defined as controlling who has access to a 
resource, under what condition that access can occur and what is exactly 
the accessing entity can do. It can be easily seen that this service can be 
mixed with the authentication service, but it is not the same while it is 
based on the authentication service as the starting point of performing 
access control. 
1.2 Thesis Motivations and Objectives 
Studies in the cryptography and cryptanalysis fields are enormous and 
very intensive. The field is little bit complex and is a challenge, especially 
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to engineers. Each country in the world tries to have its own information 
security technology as this type of technology must be local. It is not of 
any wise to secure your information giving the others the keys to your 
security facilities. This is exactly what happen when such information 
security is obtained from outside without a deep knowledge of how it 
works.  
It is not only national security requirements that urge the study of 
information security but also many new commercial applications and new 
digital society approach make it very important to provide new techniques 
and mechanisms suitable for each application. 
It was chosen to study the science itself instead of its application as this is 
the logical start point for a valuable contribution. Cryptology also 
contains a solid mathematical and theoretical foundation opening a wide 
prospect for research.  
Most of the studies in cryptology are either built on statistical studies or 
very solid mathematical foundations which points out a very good place 
for intelligent system to be introduced. Genetic algorithms are very 
attractive search tools that need careful and deep study to fit them in the 
scope of cryptanalysis and key recovery. Also neural networks are 
nonlinear systems that can perform mapping from a domain to another 
and can be used also to approximate such mappings. Hence neural 
networks can be used as cryptanalysis tools and also can be used as a 
building block in block ciphers. 
The objectives of this thesis are to propose novel techniques and suitable 
frameworks for using intelligent systems for information security. 
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1.3 Thesis Methodology 
The thesis methodology can be summarized in the following points 
1. Deep and detailed study of both cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
2. Study of week points and points of improvement of both 
cryptanalysis and cryptography. 
3. Detailed study of two successful attacks on block ciphers. 
4. Introducing  a framework of using genetic algorithms in 
cryptanalysis 
5. Proposing a complete formulation of the key search cryptanalysis 
problem as a genetic algorithm optimal key search problem 
6. Proposing a neural network based extension to the interpolation 
attack. 
7. Testing the proposed attacks through a large number of 
experimentation on the two basic models of block ciphers instead 
of a certain category of actual block ciphers so as to be able to 
extend the attack to any block cipher based on those basic 
models. 
8. Proposing a new cipher based on the use of neural network as a 
core function and providing details about its security and 
performance 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into 7 chapters and 2 appendices. This chapter, 
chapter one, gives a general introduction and details the motivations, 
objectives and methodology used while working through out the research. 
Chapter two begins with a historical background of ciphers and then it 
gives details about symmetric block ciphers and their operation and 
introduces basic concepts of cryptology. Three common used block 
ciphers are detailed at the end of the chapter.  
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Chapter three descries the concept of cryptanalysis providing details 
about two major cryptanalysis techniques, namely differential and 
interpolation attacks.  
In chapter four a proposal for using genetic algorithm as an extension to 
differential cryptanalysis is given. The proposed attack is applied to both 
the basic Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) and the Feistel 
Network (FN). 
Chapter five details the proposal of using neural networks, namely back 
propagation networks, as a cryptanalysis tools that outperforms classical 
interpolation attacks. Example of applying the attack on a hypothetical 
cipher with a core function from the Rijndael cipher is given. 
Chapter six describes the proposal of using neural networks as a highly 
nonlinear, confusing component with large input and output sizes for 
better security. 
Chapter seven finally gives the conclusions of the thesis and a list of 
examples of future work points 
Appendix A contains a brief introduction to genetic algorithms and neural 
networks while appendix B gives some  background for the mathematics 
used through out the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: An Overview of Block Ciphers 
ymmetric block ciphers have always been the most famous and 
important element in many cryptographic systems. Individually, 
they provide confidentiality paradigm but their flexibility allows 
them to be used as fundamental building blocks in the construction of 
pseudorandom number generators, stream ciphers, and hash functions. 
They may furthermore serve as a central component in message 
authentication techniques, data integrity mechanisms, entity 
authentication protocols, and (symmetric-key) digital signature schemes. 
No block cipher is ideally suited for all applications, even one offering a 
high level of security. This is a result of expected tradeoffs required in 
practical applications, including those arising from speed requirements 
and memory limitations, and also constraints imposed by implementation 
platforms and application constraints [1]. 
The main design principle behind most of the block ciphers are based on 
Claude Shannon principles of confusion and diffusion. Also the concept 
of product cipher that is building complicated cipher using simpler 
building blocks is a key concept in block cipher design. The works of 
Feistel are the major starting points in modern block ciphers design. 
The following sections describe the concepts and details of block ciphers. 
First a historical background is given then a detailed description of the 
basic two models used in most modern block ciphers is illustrated. Modes 
of operations and their effects on the security and performance of block 
ciphers are then detailed. Finally three examples of the most widely used 
modern block ciphers are detailed. 
S 
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2.1 Historical Background of cryptology 
2.1.1 Cryptographic Model 
By cryptology we mean the study of both cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
Cryptography was previously defined and includes many processes, like 
encryption, decryption and hashing. 
Cryptanalysis forms the measuring tool to judge how secure a 
cryptographic algorithm is. 
Before going into further details let us give some definitions. 
Plaintext is the information that can be interpreted for the purpose it is 
originally intended to. 
The term text should not be confusing as the definition as given here is a 
general for any type of information in digital format. It can include sound 
or video for example. The term text is inherited from the ancient use of 
cryptography.  
Ciphertext is the information in a form that can not be interpreted until it 
is converted back into its original form. 
Encryption or Encipherment is the process of converting plaintext into 
ciphertext. In most cases the encryption process is characterized by a key. 
The encryption can be viewed as a transformation from the plaint text 
domain into the ciphertext domain )(,: PECKeE ee   where E is the 
encryption transformation, P is the plaintext, C is the ciphertext, e is the 
key and K is the key space. 
Decryption or Decipherment is the process of converting ciphertext back 
into plaintext. 
Also decryption can be viewed as a transformation from the ciphertext 
domain into the plaintext domain characterized by a key  
)(,: CDPKdD dd   where D is the decryption transformation, P is the 
plaintext, C is the ciphertext, d is the key and K is the key space. 
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Cipher is an algorithm that defines both encryption and decryption 
processes that the two processes are inverse of each other that is 
))(( PEDP ed  
By knowing the key it is always computationally easy to perform any of 
the transformations but if the key is unknown it must be very difficult or 
impossible to perform any of the transformations, encryption or 
decryption. 
Figure 2.1 shows a model of using a cipher to achieve secured 
communication 
  
Figure 2.1: A SECURED COMMUNICATION MODEL USING A CIPHER 
As can be seen from the figure, the communication is done over a public 
unsecured channel where others, adversary, can monitor, or even has a 
complete copy of, the data transferred. 
The communication is secured by using a reversible encryption scheme, 
where the source, Alice, encrypts the output message using the cipher E 
characterized by the key e. The receiver, Bob, decrypts the message he 
receives by the inverse operation, decryption, D using the decryption key 
d. The adversary who does not have the key d can't decrypt the transfer 
and hence can not interpret it.  
The entire security of the model relies on the security of the cipher. A 
cipher security can be defined by the effort, time and computational 
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resources, used to break the cipher. An encryption scheme is said to be 
breakable if a third party, without prior knowledge of the key pair (e, d), 
can systematically recover plaintext from corresponding ciphertext within 
some appropriate time frame. 
Formal definitions of security include two of them [2]. 
Unconditional security:  A cipher is said to be unconditionally secure if it 
is impossible to decrypt a ciphertext generated by the cipher scheme no 
matter how much time and computational resources are available for an 
adversary. Except for the one time pad or Vernam cipher, there is no 
cipher scheme that is unconditionally secure. 
Computational security:  A cipher is said to be computationally secure if 
it is infeasible by using the available computational resources to decrypt a 
ciphertext generated by the cipher in a suitable time frame that the 
decrypted text is useful. Most of the block cipher designers seek a suitable 
computational security for their ciphers. 
Cryptanalysis is the study of mathematical techniques for attempting to 
defeat cryptographic techniques. 
A cryptanalyst is someone who engages in cryptanalysis. 
A cryptosystem is a general term referring to a set of cryptographic 
primitives used to provide information security services. Most often the 
term is used in conjunction with primitives providing confidentiality, i.e., 
encryption. 
2.1.2 Symmetric Ciphers 
Consider an encryption scheme consisting of the sets of encryption and 
decryption transformations KeEe : and KdDd : , respectively, where 
K is the key space. The encryption scheme is said to be symmetric-key if 
for each associated encryption/decryption key pair (e, d), it is 
computationally “easy” to determine d knowing only e, and to determine 
e from d only. 
Since e = d in most practical symmetric-key encryption schemes, the term 
symmetric-key becomes appropriate [1]. 
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Symmetric ciphers were the only used methods in cryptography until the 
discovery of public key cryptosystem in the end of 1970s.  
Symmetric ciphers is also known as secret key ciphers as the key is 
always kept secret for the security of the system, opposed to public key 
cipher where one of the key pair is known to the public where the other, 
private key, is kept secret. 
Some literature also calls symmetric key cipher as private key ciphers, 
this naming should not to be used as it is little bit confusing with the 
private key element that must be kept secret in the public key 
cryptographic systems and hence it is not going to be used in the scope of 
this work. 
2.1.3 Classical Ciphers 
Cryptography is used from very ancient ages. The Egyptians may be the 
first to use cryptography basically when they invented writing. The 
ancient written language was a secret one known only to religious men 
and magicians. Symbols were used to represent abstract meanings and 
thoughts. In literature, it is often referred to Julius Caesar as the one who 
invented the first cipher known as Caesar Cipher. 
It is worth to introduce here two more definitions 
A block cipher is an encryption scheme which breaks up the plaintext 
messages to be transmitted into strings (called blocks) of a fixed length t 
over an alphabet A, and encrypts one block at a time. 
Substitution ciphers are block ciphers which replace symbols (or groups 
of symbols) by other symbols or groups of symbols. 
2.1.3.1 Caesar Cipher 
Caesar cipher is basically a substitution symmetric block cipher where the 
alphabet is used as the domain of both the plaintext and ciphertext. 
Original Caesar cipher substitutes each alphabet character with one three 
position after, for example the word TEXT is encrypted into WHAW, 
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note that the character X is mapped to A. This classical cipher can be 
modeled by the following equations 
sKPC mod  (2.1) 
where P is the original letter from the alphabet K is the key and s is the 
number of letters in the alphabet. The decryption is defined as  
sKCP mod   (2.2) 
In his cipher, Caesar used K=3 and s is 26 for English language. 
Caesar cipher uses a block size of one letter from the alphabet. 
Caesar cipher is not secure as we have only 26 mappings (one of them is 
trivial where k=0). 
As the key space is very limited the cipher can be broken by using a brute 
force attack where all the possible values of the key is tested until a 
meaningful text is obtained.  
2.1.3.2 Mono-alphabetic cipher 
Caesar cipher can be extended into what is so called a simple substitution 
cipher or a mono-alphabetic cipher where the key space is extended to be 
very large  
Let A be an alphabet of q symbols and M be the set of all strings of length 
t over A. Let K be the set of all permutations on the set A. Define for each  
e   K an encryption transformation Ee as:  
Ee(m) = (e(m1)e(m2)  ...e(mt)) = (c1 c2 ..ct) =c; (2.3) 
Where m = (m1 m2 …mt) M. In other words, for each symbol in a t-
tuple, replace (substitute) it by another symbol from A according to some 
fixed permutation e. To decrypt c = (c1 c2 … ct) compute the inverse 
permutation d = e-1  and  
Dd(c) =(d(c1)d(c2) … d(ct)) = (m1 m2 …mt) =m (2.4) 
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Ee is called a simple substitution cipher or a mono-alphabetic substitution 
cipher. 
So rather than just shifting the alphabet, it is possible to shuffle (jumble) 
the letters arbitrarily. Each plaintext letter maps to a different random 
ciphertext letter, hence key is 26 letters long. 
For example 
Plain: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ  
Cipher:DKVQFIBJWPESCXHTMYAUOLRGZN 
Then a message "if we wish to replace letters" is going to be ciphered as 
follows 
Plaintext: IFWEWISHTOREPLACELETTERS 
Ciphertext: WIRFRWAJUHYFTSDVFSFUUFYA 
Now having a total of 26! = 4 x 1026 keys which is a very large key space 
making brute force attack non practical. With so many keys we might 
think mono alphabetic cipher is secure but would be wrong. The reader is 
referred to chapter 3 for more details. An attack based on language 
characteristics can be mounted on the cipher with a complexity far below 
the brute force one. 
Human languages are redundant, that is letters are not equally commonly 
used. For example in English e is by far the most common letter then 
T,R,N,I,O,A,S other letters are fairly rare e.g. Z,J,K,Q,X  
We can build tables of single, double & triple letter frequencies in any 
language from large common conversations or text and have a common 
letter frequency chart that can be used to attack the cipher. 
Although the mono alphabetic cipher has a large key space, each 
character is always mapped into a certain other character from the 
alphabet so the statistical nature of the language is not changed from the 
plaintext to the ciphertext. 
Building a chart of the letter frequency of the ciphertext and mapping it to 
the original chart can be used to discover the original text. The frequency 
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is not only for single letters but it can also be calculated for pairs of 
letters, in English "th" is the most common diagram, and also group of 
three letters frequency can be calculated, in English "the" is the most 
common trigram. From this information an attack can be successful. 
Figure 2.2 shows a frequency chart for each letter in English language [2] 
 
Figure 2.2: ENGLISH LETTER FREQUENCIES 
The simplicity and strength of the mono alphabetic substitution cipher 
meant it dominated cryptographic use for the first millennium AD. It was 
broken by Arabic scientists. The earliest known description is in 
AlKindi's "A Manuscript on Deciphering Cryptographic Messages", 
" ت ُى م ُع لا  اارختسا يف ةلاسر", published in the 9
th century but only rediscovered 
in 1987 in Damascus, but other later works also attest to their knowledge 
of the field. 
The language redundancy and statistical property usage in cryptanalysis 
was the basic tool in cryptanalysis until recent modern block ciphers. 
Many ciphers have been invented until the end of World War II trying to 
overcome the problem of cryptanalysis arose from language redundancy.  
2.1.3.3 Homophonic substitution cipher  
To each symbol a   A, associate a set H(a) of strings of t symbols, with 
the restriction that the sets H(a), a   A, be pair wise disjoint. A 
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homophonic substitution cipher replaces each symbol a in a plaintext 
message block with a randomly chosen string from H(a). To decrypt a 
string c of t symbols, one must determine an a   A such that c   H(a). 
The key for the cipher consists of the sets H(a). 
2.1.3.4 Poly alphabetic cipher 
A poly alphabetic substitution cipher is a block cipher with block length t 
over an alphabet A having the following properties: 
 The key space K consists of all ordered sets of t permutations (p1, 
p2, … pt),where each permutation pi is defined on the set A; 
 Encryption of the message m = (m1 m2 …mt) under the key e = 
(p1, p2, … pt) is given by Ee(m) = (p1(m1)p2(m2) … pt(mt));and 
 The decryption key associated with e = (p1, p2, … pt) is d = (p1-1, 
p2
-1, … pt-1) 
2.1.3.5 Transposition ciphers 
Another class of symmetric-key ciphers is the simple transposition cipher, 
which simply permutes the symbols in a block. 
Consider a symmetric-key block encryption scheme with block length t. 
Let K be the set of all permutations on the set {1,2,….,t}. For each e   K 
define the encryption function 
Ee (m) =(me(1) me(2)…. me(t) ) (2.5) 
where m = (m1m2…..mt) M, the message space. The set of all such 
transformations is called a simple transposition cipher. The decryption 
key corresponding to e is the  inverse permutation d = e-1. To decrypt c = 
(c1 c2 ….ct), compute  
Dd(c) =(cd(1) cd(2) … cd(t) ). (2.6) 
A simple transposition cipher preserves the number of symbols of a given 
type within a block, and thus is easily cryptanalyzed. 
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2.1.3.6 Stream ciphers 
Stream ciphers form an important class of symmetric-key encryption 
schemes. They are, in one sense, very simple block ciphers having block 
length equal to one. What makes them useful is the fact that the 
encryption transformation can change for each symbol of plain-text being 
encrypted. In situations where transmission errors are highly probable, 
stream ciphers are advantageous because they have no error propagation. 
They can also be used when the data must be processed one symbol at a 
time (e.g., if the equipment has no memory or buffering of data is 
limited). 
Let K be the key space for a set of encryption transformations. A 
sequence of symbols e1 e2 e3 …ei   K, is called a key stream. 
Let A be an alphabet of q symbols and let Ee be a simple substitution 
cipher with block length 1 where e   K. Let m1 m2 m3 … be a plaintext 
string and let e1 e2 e3 ….be a key stream from K. A stream cipher takes 
the plaintext string and produces a ciphertext string c1 c2 c3 ….  
Where ci = Eei (mi).If di denotes the inverse of ei, then Ddi (ci) =mi 
decrypts the ciphertext string. 
2.1.3.7 Vernam cipher 
The Vernam Cipher is a stream cipher defined on the alphabet A = {0, 
1}.A binary message m1 m2 m3 …mt is operated on by a binary key string 
k1 k2 k3 …kt of the same length to produce a ciphertext string c1 c2 c3 …ct 
where 
tikmc iii  1  (2.7) 
If the key string is randomly chosen and never used again, the Vernam 
cipher is called a one-time system or a one-time pad. 
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It mentioned in [1] that to realize an unbreakable system requires a 
random key of the same length as the message. This reduces the 
practicality of the system in all but a few specialized situations. 
2.2 Confusion and Diffusion 
Most of the old attacks on simple ciphers were based on statistical 
analysis of the output of the cipher compared to the statistical 
characteristics of the used language of the cipher-text. For example 
knowing that the most frequent letter in English language is the letter E, 
results in full discovery of the key used in Caesar cipher, which is a 
simple substitution cipher [1]. 
Alternating confusion and diffusion was proposed in [3] to build a 
product cipher [2]. The idea behind this proposal is to protect the cipher 
against statistical analysis of output of the cipher system.  
In Diffusion, the statistical information of the plaintext is dissipated in a 
longer range of statistical structure of the cipher-text by making a single 
plaintext bit affects many bits in the cipher-text, or equivalently, making 
each cipher-text bit a function of many plaintext bits. This diffusion can 
be achieved by applying some permutation on the input bits and applying 
some function on the output of the permutation. This makes bits from 
different positions in the plaintext contribute in the production of a single 
bit in the cipher-text. So diffusion makes the relation between the 
statistics of the input text and the output cipher-text as complex as 
possible.  
Confusion does the same function but between the output bits and the key 
bits. Thus knowing any information about the statistics of the cipher-text 
gives the attacker no idea about how the key bits were used to produce 
that output. This confusion can be achieved by using complex non-linear 
substitution mapping keyed by the key bits [2]. 
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2.3 Iterated Block Ciphers 
2.3.1 Ideal Block Cipher 
As has been shown previously Secret-key algorithms can be divided into 
block and stream ciphers.  
For a block cipher the encryption transformation, for a randomly chosen 
key, is often modeled as a random permutation, that is, a permutation 
chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations of the 
plaintext space. The main design criterion for a (secure) block cipher is: 
A block cipher should be indistinguishable from a random permutation, 
for every key; in that case it is called an ideal block cipher [2]. Figure 2.3 
shows a permutation for a 4 bit block cipher 
 
Figure 2.3: GENERAL 4 TO 4 BIT BLOCK PERMUTATION 
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In practice, for a random n-bit block cipher there are 2n! possible 
permutations of the plaintexts, which means that the amount of key bits 
needed to provide all possible permutations is log2(2
n!)   n . 2n. Key size 
of most block ciphers is not more than a small multiple of the block size. 
Therefore, these block ciphers can provide only a small fraction of the 
total amount of possible permutations. For example, in, Data Encryption 
Standard, DES the key size is k = 56 bits and the block size is n = 64 bits. 
Therefore, out of the 264! permutations of 64-bit blocks, only 256 
transformations can be selected. This example is shows how far DES is 
from an ideal block cipher. The key size of 56 bits is much less than the 
ideal key size which is 270 as 270>>>56. 
Every attack on a block cipher starts by distinguishing the given cipher 
from a random permutation. The next step is usually a key-recovery 
attack if the resulting complexity is lower than that of a brute-force attack. 
The proposed alternation of confusion and diffusion introduced the 
concept of a product cipher that combines simple operations, which 
individually do not provide sufficient protection, but jointly, results in a 
complex and more secure cipher. Further, in order to simplify the 
implementation, many product ciphers have an iterated structure. 
An iterated block cipher consists of the composition of a key-dependent 
and invertible structure called a round transformation. Two kinds of round 
structure are most commonly found in modern iterated block ciphers: the 
Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) and the Feistel Network (FN). 
The round transformation Ti of both types of iterated ciphers has the 
following general form: Xi = Ti(Xi-1;Ki), where Xi-1 is the i
th round input 
block, Xi is the output of the i
th round and Ki is the round sub key. The 
initial input, X0, is the plaintext block, and the output after r rounds, Xr, is 
the ciphertext block. 
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2.3.2 Basic Substitution Permutation Networks 
Feistel [4] was the first to suggest that an SPN architecture consisting of 
rounds of nonlinear substitutions (S-boxes) connected by bit position 
permutations was a simple, effective implementation of Shannon’s 
concept of a “mixing transformation” based on the principles of 
“confusion” and “diffusion” [3]. Many modern block ciphers, including 
Rijndael cipher [5], [6], which is selected as the new AES, Advanced 
Encryption Standard, by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, NIST are based on the basic SPN, so understanding such 
architecture is very helpful for the other modern block ciphers. 
2.3.2.1 Substitution  
The description of the basic SPN is best declared in [7]. In this cipher, the 
16-bit data block is broken into four 4-bit sub-blocks. Each sub-block 
forms an input to a 44 S-box (a substitution with 4 input and 4 output 
bits), which can be easily implemented with a lookup table, like the one 
presented in table 2.1, of sixteen 4-bit values, indexed by the integer 
represented by the 4 input bits. The most fundamental property of an S-
box is that it is a nonlinear mapping, i.e., the output bits cannot be 
represented as a linear operation on the input bits. The mapping chosen 
for this cipher, given in Table 2.2, is chosen from the S-boxes of DES. In 
the table, the most significant bit of the hexadecimal notation represents 
the leftmost bit of the S-box in Figure 2.4.  
Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
Output E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7 
Table 2.1. S-box Representation (in hexadecimal)  
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Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F  
S11 E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7 
S12 0 F 7 4 E 2 D 1 A 6 C B 9 5 3 8 
S13 4 1 E 8 D 6 2 B F C 9 7 3 A 5 0 
S14 F C 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 B 3 E A 0 6 D 
S21 F 1 8 E 6 B 3 4 9 7 2 D C 0 5 A 
S22 3 D 4 7 F 2 8 E C 0 1 A 6 9 B 5 
S23 0 E 7 B A 4 D 1 5 8 C 6 9 3 2 F 
S24 D 8 A 1 3 F 4 2 B 6 7 C 0 5 E 9 
S31 A 0 9 E 6 3 F 5 1 D C 7 B 4 2 8 
S32 D 7 0 9 3 4 6 A 2 8 5 E C B F 1 
S33 D 6 4 9 8 F 3 0 B 1 2 C 5 A E 7 
S34 1 A D 0 6 9 8 7 4 F E 3 B 5 2 C 
S41 7 D E 3 0 6 9 A 1 2 8 5 B C 4 F 
S42 D 8 B 5 6 F 0 3 4 7 2 C 1 A E 9 
S43 A 6 9 0 C B 7 D F 1 3 E 5 2 8 4 
S44 3 F 0 6 A 1 D 8 9 4 5 B C 7 2 E 
Table 2.2 16 S-Boxes used in the SPN 
 
Figure 2.4: S-BOX MAPPING 
 
2.3.2.2 Permutation  
The permutation portion of a round is simply the transposition of the bits 
or the permutation of the bit positions. The permutation of Figure 2.5 is 
given in Table 2.3 (where the numbers represent bit positions in the 
block, with 1 being the leftmost bit and 16 being the rightmost bit) and 
can be simply described as: the output i of S-box j is connected to input j 
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of S-box i. Note that there would be no purpose for a permutation in the 
last round and, hence, this cipher does not need a permutation. 
Input 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  
Output 1 5 9 13 2 6 10 14 3 7 11 15 4 8 12 16 
 Table 2.3 Permutation  
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Figure 2.5: BASIC SUBSTITUTION-PERMUTATION NETWORK (SPN) CIPHER 
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2.3.2.3 Key Mixing  
To achieve the key mixing, a simple bit-wise exclusive-OR between the 
key bits associated with a round (referred to as a sub-key) and the data 
block input to the round is used. As well, a sub-key is applied following 
the last round, ensuring that the last layer of substitution cannot be easily 
ignored by a cryptanalyst which simply works backward through the last 
round’s substitution.  Normally, in a cipher, the sub-key for a round is 
derived from the cipher’s master key through a process known as the key 
schedule. In this cipher, all bits of the sub-keys are independently 
generated and unrelated.  
2.3.2.4 Decryption  
To perform decryption, ciphertext is essentially passed backwards 
through the network. Hence, decryption is also of the form of an SPN as 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. However, the mappings used in the S-boxes of 
the decryption network are the inverse of the mappings in the encryption 
network (i.e., input becomes output, output becomes input). This implies 
that for an SPN to allow for decryption, all S-boxes must be bijective, that 
is, a one-to-one mapping with the same number of input and output bits. 
For the network to properly decrypt, the sub-keys are applied in reverse 
order and the bits of the sub-keys must be moved around according to the 
permutation, if the SPN is to look similar to Figure 2.5. Note also that the 
lack of the permutation after the last round ensures that the decryption 
network can be of the same structure as the encryption network. 
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2.3.3 Feistel Ciphers 
Feistel also proposed another product cipher widely known as Feistel 
cipher or Feistel network [2]. Unlike the SPN, Feistel network can be 
composed of non-reversible components while the entire cipher remains 
reversible. The idea is also based on performing successive rounds of 
substitution followed by some sort of halves swapping and XOR. Feistel 
cipher is very popular and many famous block ciphers use this structure 
like DES and Blowfish. 
The following sections will describe the basic Feistel network structure 
2.3.3.1 Basic Feistel Cipher Structure 
The basic Feistel cipher with six rounds is shown in figure 2.6 
 
Figure 2.6: A 6 ROUND FEISTEL NETWORK 
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As seen from figure 2.6, Feistel cipher gets a block of 2n bits of plaintext 
and produces a 2n bits block of cipher-text.  
Each block is divided into two halves, a left (L) and a right (R) ones n bits 
each. 
The two halves block passes through a number of rounds (in our case they 
are five complete rounds and a final one). In each round an initial 
permutation of the right half into the output left half is done, then the right 
half is passed through a keyed function using an m bits key (usually m=n) 
and finally the output is mixed with the left half with an XOR. Equations 
2.8 and 2.9 describe the input output relation of a round. 
Consider the input block to round i is Li-1Ri-1 then the output of the round 
is 
1
 ii RL  (2.8) 
iiiii LKRFR   ),( 1  (2.9) 
Where Fi is a keyed function that maps n bits input to n bits output. 
In the final round, there is a block permutation. This round gives the 
Feistel cipher a very interesting phenomenon, which is decryption is 
basically an encryption with reversed order keys and functions (Ki, Fi). 
To show this criterion, consider figure 2.7 of one round of a Feistel cipher 
 
Figure 2.7: ONE ROUND OF A FEISTEL NETWORK 
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Now applying equations 2.8 and 2.9 we find that  
rl XY   (2.10) 
lrr XKXFY  ),(  (2.11) 
Now consider swapping the outputs and feeding them back again into the 
same round, see figure 2.8 
 
Figure 2.8: OUTPUT SWAPPED AND FED AGAIN TO THE ROUND 
Applying the equation again will result the following 
rll XYZ   (2.12) 
rr
rlr
YKXF
YKYFZ


),(
),(
 (2.13) 
Substituting 2.11 into 2.13. results 
llrrr XXKXFKXFZ  ),(),(  (2.14) 
And from 2.12 and 2.14 we notice that the original block is restored but in 
reverse order. The last block permutation round give the Fiestel cipher its 
nature of being reversible 
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2.3.3.2 Encryption 
Encryption is performed by passing the 2n bits block through rounds in 
forward order. Each round involves a keyed function that has two inputs, 
a half block and a round key. This function provides the confusion effect 
of the cipher and it may also provide diffusion if permutation is used 
inside it. 
The round function generally acts on two inputs, the half block input and 
key, but usually bit wise XOR is used to mix the key with the half block 
and then the result is passed to a complex function. Another approach is 
to use a key dependent round function that is selected by the key itself. 
Blowfish is an example of using key dependent round function. 
In DES the round function F is a very complex one with substitution and 
bit position permutation which involves expansion and compression of 
bits. 
2.3.3.3 Decryption 
Decryption is as mentioned before uses the same encryption structure by 
passing the cipher-text through the system but with reversed order keys 
(Kn, Kn-1, … K1) and functions. This means that it is not needed to 
implement separate encryption and decryption algorithms. 
2.3.4 Key Scheduling 
In both of the two models described earlier, each sub round needs an m 
bit key. The most secured way is to have independent round keys but this 
is impractical, since in many ciphers, the number of rounds is very big 
and also the key size, for example in DES we have 16 rounds with 56 bit 
round key and in Rijndael 128 variant we have 11 rounds with 128 bits 
round key. 
Instead of using independent round keys, a scheduling algorithm is used 
to generate each round key from the original cipher key. Key scheduling 
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is a major component in the overall cipher design and may be a week 
point from which attacker may compromise the entire cipher. 
2.4 Modes of Operation 
2.4.1 Definition and characteristics of a mode of operation 
As discussed in the previous section, it is concluded that a block cipher is 
basically a transformation or mapping between two domains, the plaintext 
domain and the ciphertext domain. 
The block cipher as described is said to be working in the Electronic Code 
Book mode, ECB, 
In this mode, the plaintext must be subdivided into n bits blocks, padding 
for smaller blocks may be needed.  
Also if the same block is fed to the cipher more than one time, the result 
blocks of ciphertext will always be the same. 
Of course the statistical analysis of large block size is very hard but it is 
still going to increase the security if the output ciphertext block depends 
not only on the input plaintext block but also on the entire plian text 
blocks or at least the once preceded this block. 
Moreover, depending on the cryptographic application, the plaintext 
messages may need to be processed in segments smaller than the block 
size, characters for example, 
Modes of operations are a form of cryptographic protocol that provides 
solutions to the mentioned problems. 
Each mode of operation can be characterized by the following parameters 
[8], 
 Plaintext Redundancy: means that the mode allows the plain-text 
statistics to propagate to the ciphertext, for example, if equal 
plaintext blocks are being encrypted to the same ciphertext block 
(Knudsen [9]).  
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 Random Access: means that the mode allows an arbitrary 
ciphertext block to be read or modified without the need to access 
or modify (update) other blocks. 
 Parallel Processing: means that the mode allows simultaneous 
processing of neighbouring blocks.  
 Error Expansion: concerns garbled text blocks due to bit-flipping 
errors (bits are complemented but there is no change in the amount 
of bits) or slip errors (arbitrary insertion or deletion of bits) in the 
ciphertext which results in one of the following cases: 
o No error expansion (errors limited to the faulty block or 
segment) 
o Finite error expansion (a limited number of blocks are 
affected), 
o Infinite error expansion.  
 Counter or Initial Value: means that the mode requires additional 
values, independent of the text and the key, for each new message 
or for resynchronization. Such values may be (for security 
reasons): 
o Random 
o Unpredictable 
o Non-repeating.  
2.4.2 The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode 
The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode has been standardized by NIST 
[10] and ISO [11].  
ECB consists of encrypting each individual plaintext block independently 
of the other blocks.  
Encryption is defined as )(,: PECKkE kk   where E is the encryption 
transformation, P is the plaintext block, C is the ciphertext block, e is the 
key and K is the key space. Decryption is defined as 
)(,: CDPKkD kk  . Figure 2.9 demonstrates the ECB mode 
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Figure 2.9: ECB MODE 
Table 2.4 shows the characteristics of the ECB mode based on the 
measuring parameters introduced earlier 
Encryption )( iki PEC   
Decryption )( iki CDP   
Plaintext redundancy Not concealed in ECB mode because each 
block is encrypted separately, and equal 
plaintext blocks, under the same key, 
result in equal ciphertext blocks.  
Random access Since each block is considered separately, 
Random access is possible 
Parallel processing Possible due to independent encryption 
(decryption) of each block 
Bit-flipping errors propagation The error does not propagate from a block 
to the next and is limited only to the block 
it happened in. 
Slip errors propagation The slip error propagates infinitely 
because block boundaries are totally lost 
Counter or Initial Value No extra value other than the key is 
needed for this ECB mode to operate 
Table 2.4: ECB Mode Characteristics. 
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Because of the independent processing of each text block, an attacker can 
insert, delete or change the order of ciphertext blocks without affecting 
decryption, unless there is enough plaintext redundancy or some separate 
integrity mechanism to allow detection of active tampering. 
2.4.3 The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode 
The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode has been also standardized by 
NIST [10] and ISO [11]. CBC consists of processing plaintext blocks 
combined with a feedback of the previous ciphertext block.  
Figure 2.10 demonstrates the CBC mode 
 
Figure 2.10: CBC MODE 
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Table 2.5 shows the characteristics of the CBC mode 
Encryption 
IVC
CPEC iiki

 
0
1)(
 
Decryption 
1
0
)( 

iiki CCDP
IVC
 
Plaintext redundancy Concealed in CBC mode because each 
block depends on the previous blocks  
Random access Since each block is dependent on the 
previous block, Random access is possible 
if the previous block is known. 
Parallel processing Chaining is sequential 
Bit-flipping errors propagation The bit flipping error of a ciphertext block 
affects the block and the one after, finite 
propagation. Upon receiving two correct 
blocks the mode resynchronizes itself. 
Slip errors propagation The slip error propagates infinitely 
because block boundaries are totally lost 
Counter or Initial Value Initial value is needed. The choice of the 
initial value affects the security of the 
mode. It should be randomly selected and 
key independent [12] 
Table 2.5: CBC Mode Characteristics. 
2.4.4 The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode 
The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode has been standardized by NIST [10] 
and ISO [11]. CFB generates a key-and data-dependent stream of 
segments of r bits ≤ n bits, block size that is combined via XOR to the 
plaintext.  
Figure 2.11 demonstrates the CFB mode 
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Figure 2.11: CFB MODE 
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Table 2.6 shows the characteristics of the CFB mode 
Encryption 
iirni
ikrii
cIrightI
IEleftPC
IVI
||)(
))((
1
1
0




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Decryption 
iirni
ikrii
cIrightI
IEleftCP
IVI
||)(
))((
1
1
0





 
Plaintext redundancy Concealed in CFB mode because each 
block depends on the previous blocks  
Random access 
Random access requires 





r
n
segments or 
the initial value. 
Parallel processing Sequential 
Bit-flipping errors propagation The bit flipping error of a ciphertext block 
affects the block and next blocks until the r 
bits containing the error are shifted out. 
Slip errors propagation The slip error propagates infinitely 
because block boundaries are totally lost if 
the slip is not bounded to exactly r bits. If r 
bits slip occurs, the propagation is like bit 
flipping 
Counter or Initial Value Initial value is needed. The choice of the 
initial value affects the security of the 
mode. It should be randomly selected and 
key independent. The initial value needn't 
be secret. 
Table 2.6: CFB Mode Characteristics. 
Note that only encryption operation is considered. The CFB mode can be 
used to implement stream ciphers using n bits block ciphers. 
2.4.5 Output Feedback (OFB) mode 
The Output Feedback (OFB) mode has been standardized by NIST [10] 
and ISO [11]. OFB generates a key stream [13] in steps of n bits, of which 
r ≤ n bits can be combined to the plaintext segments via exclusive-or.  
Figure 2.12 demonstrates the OFB mode 
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Figure 2.12: OFB MODE 
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Table 2.7 shows the characteristics of the OFB mode 
Encryption 
)(
)(
1
0



iki
irii
IEI
IleftPC
IVI
 
Decryption 
)(
)(
1
0



iki
irii
IEI
IleftCP
IVI
 
Plaintext redundancy Concealed in OFB mode because each 
block depends on the previous blocks  
Random access Since each block is considered separately, 
Random access is possible 
Parallel processing Also parallel processing is possible (if all 
the I elements are generated previously 
knowing the initial value) due to 
independent encryption (decryption) of 
each block 
Bit-flipping errors propagation The error does not propagate from a block 
to the next and is limited only to the block 
it happened in. 
Slip errors propagation The slip error propagates infinitely 
because initial value is totally lost and 
resynchronization is needed. 
Counter or Initial Value Initial value is needed. The choice of the 
initial value affects the security of the 
mode. It should be randomly selected and 
key independent. It should also be changed 
rapidly 
Table 2.7: OFB Mode Characteristics. 
As in CFB, Note that only encryption operation is considered. The OFB 
mode can be used to implement stream ciphers using n bits block ciphers. 
2.4.6 The Counter (CTR) mode 
The Counter (CTR) mode was originally suggested by Diffie and 
Hellman [14]. More recently it was reviewed and submitted by Lipmaa et 
al. [15] for the NIST Modes of Operation Workshop [16]. This mode is 
also recommended in a NIST Special Publication [17], and in ISO [11]. 
The CTR mode consists of processing plaintext blocks with a counter-
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dependent encrypted output [18]. Figure 2.13 demonstrates the CTR 
mode 
 
Figure 2.13: CTR MODE 
Table 2.8 shows the characteristics of the CTR mode 
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Encryption 
n
ii
ikii
II
IEPC
IVI
2mod)1(
)(
1
1
0
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


  
Decryption 
n
ii
ikii
II
IECP
IVI
2mod)1(
)(
1
1
0




  
Plaintext redundancy Concealed in CTR mode because each 
block depends on the time (cont) at which 
it was encoded.  
Random access Since each block is considered separately, 
Random access is possible 
Parallel processing Also parallel processing is possible (if all 
the I elements are generated previously 
knowing the initial value) due to 
independent encryption (decryption) of 
each block 
Bit-flipping errors propagation The error does not propagate from a block 
to the next and is limited only to the block 
it happened in. 
Slip errors propagation The slip error propagates infinitely 
because initial value is totally lost and 
resynchronization is needed. 
Counter or Initial Value Initial value is needed. The choice of the 
initial value affects the security of the 
mode. It should be randomly selected and 
key independent. It should also be changed 
rapidly and should have a very long 
period. 
 
Table 2.8: CTR Mode Characteristics. 
After the AES Development Process [19], NIST organized two 
workshops to discuss new and existing modes of operation for the AES in 
particular, and for block ciphers in general. In 2001, NIST issued a 
special publication [17] suggesting the five modes described previously. 
Nonetheless, several other modes were submitted for evaluation, 
including: the ABC (Accumulated Block Chaining) by Knudsen [20], the 
IACBC (Integrity Aware CBC) and IAPM (Integrity Aware Parallelizable 
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Mode) by Jutla [21], the KFB (Key Feedback Mode) by Hastad and 
Naslund [22], the OCB (Offset Code Book) by Rogaway [23], the PCFB 
(Propagating CFB) by Hellstrom [24], the XCBC-XOR (Extended CBC) 
and XECB-XOR (Extended ECB) by Gligor and Donescu [25], and the 
2DEM (2D Encryption Mode) by Belal and Abdel-Gawad [26]. 
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2.5 Examples 
2.5.1 DES 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [27], [2], and [1] is the world most used 
block cipher. It was the standard of non confidential use in the United 
States government and in many commercial applications for more than 20 
years, 1977 until October 2000. The most advances in cryptanalysis 
techniques were primarily for breaking DES. Most new block ciphers are 
designed to defeat those attacks and to outperform DES. 
DES encrypts 64-bit data block using 56-bit key using a standard Feistel 
structure. It is a complicated cipher and its design steps were classified 
especially its S-Box design.  
2.5.1.1 DES History 
By the efforts of IBM to produce commercial cipher products that fit in 
one chip, IBM developed Lucifer cipher by a team led by Feistel. Lucifer 
cipher utilizes 64-bit data blocks with 128-bit key. A new version of 
Lucifer was developed for commercial interests. The new cipher was 
more resistive to cryptanalysis but with a smaller key size, to fit on single 
chip. The new key size was 56 bits. 
In 1973 the National Bureau of Standards, NBS, issued a request for 
proposals for a national cipher standard. IBM submitted their revised 
Lucifer to the NBS which was eventually accepted as the DES.  
2.5.1.2 DES structure 
DES is basically a 16 round Feistel cipher with extra round before the 
first one and its inverse after the 16th round.  
2.5.1.2.1 Initial Permutation 
The extra round is an initial permutation which rearranges the bits of the 
input 64 block of data. The initial permutation is as defined in table 2.9 
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where each cell indicates where a bit from the input should be placed after 
permutation. Bit positions are started from 1to 64. 
 
IBP OBP  IPB OBP  IPB OPB  IPB OBP 
1 58  17 62  33 57  49 61 
2 50  18 54  34 49  50 53 
3 42  19 46  35 41  51 45 
4 43  20 38  36 33  52 37 
5 26  21 30  37 25  53 29 
6 18  22 22  38 17  54 21 
7 10  23 14  39 9  55 13 
8 2  24 6  40 1  56 5 
9 60  25 64  41 59  57 63 
10 52  26 56  42 51  58 55 
11 44  27 48  43 43  59 47 
12 36  28 40  44 35  60 .39 
13 28  29 32  45 27  61 31 
14 20  30 24  46 19  62 23 
15 12  31 16  47 11  63 15 
16 4  32 8  48 3  64 7 
Table 2.9, DES Initial Permutation,  
(IBP: Input Bit Position, OBP: Output Bit Position) 
The initial permutation is just reversed after the 16th round. 
2.5.1.2.2 DES Round Structure 
DES round is a little bit complicated. It deals with the input 64 bits block 
as two 32 bits blocks labelled L and R for left and right halves. As in all 
Feistel structure, the output from the round is defined as in equations 2.8 
and 2.9 that is rewritten here 
1
 ii RL  
iiiii LKRFR   ),( 1  
Where i subscript is the round order. 
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2.5.1.2.3 DES round function F 
The round function of DES accepts 32 bits block of data and 48 bits key. 
The round function is performed on 4 stages,  
1. Expansion permutation (E) of the input block form 32 bits into 48 
bits by repeating 16 bits of the input block. 
2. Add round key using XOR 
3. Substitution choice using S-Boxes, the output of this stage is 32 
bit block. 
4. Permutation, (P) which rearranges the final 32 bits. 
Figure 2.14 shows the details of one round of DES 
 
Figure 2.14: SINGLE DES ROUND 
Each permutation above introduces some diffusion effect. The Expansion 
permutation (E) and the Permutation (P) are shown in tables 2.11 and 
2.12 respectively 
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OBP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
IBP 32 1 2 3 4 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 
             
OBP 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
IPB 8 9 10 11 12 13 12 13 14 15 16 17 
             
OBP 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
IPB 16 17 18 19 20 21 20 21 22 23 24 25 
             
OBP 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
IPB 24 25 26 27 28 29 28 29 30 31 32 1 
Table 2.10 Expansion permutation. 
While the Permutation P is as follows 
OBP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
IBP 16 7 20 21 29 12 28 17 1 15 23 26 5 18 31 10 
                 
OBP 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
IBP 2 8 24 14 32 27 3 9 19 13 30 6 22 11 4 25 
Table 2.11 Permutation. 
The heart of the DES is its S-Box structure. S-Box is a nonlinear mapping 
between its input bits and its output bits. S-Box implementation was 
always a cheap way to implement complex function in GF(2n), an 
introduction to finite fields arithmetic is given in appendix A, for small 
values of n. It is simply can be implemented in hardware or software 
using a lookup table or in other words, indexed successive memory 
locations. In DES the 48 bits input is sub divided into 8 sub blocks 6 bits 
each. Each sub block is used to produce a 4 bit output using 6 x 4 s-box. 
The structure of the S-box is little bit complex. Each s-box is divided into 
4 s-boxes 4 x 4 each. The first and last input bits select which sub s-box to 
use, and then the remaining 4 bits selects the output of the s-box. The 
result is a block of 32 bits length. Table 2.12 shows the S-Boxes of DES 
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Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F  
S1 
S11 E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7 
S12 0 F 7 4 E 2 D 1 A 6 C B 9 5 3 8 
S13 4 1 E 8 D 6 2 B F C 9 7 3 A 5 0 
S14 F C 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 B 3 E A 0 6 D 
S2 
S21 F 1 8 E 6 B 3 4 9 7 2 D C 0 5 A 
S22 3 D 4 7 F 2 8 E C 0 1 A 6 9 B 5 
S23 0 E 7 B A 4 D 1 5 8 C 6 9 3 2 F 
S24 D 8 A 1 3 F 4 2 B 6 7 C 0 5 E 9 
S3 
S31 A 0 9 E 6 3 F 5 1 D C 7 B 4 2 8 
S32 D 7 0 9 3 4 6 A 2 8 5 E C B F 1 
S33 D 6 4 9 8 F 3 0 B 1 2 C 5 A E 7 
S34 1 A D 0 6 9 8 7 4 F E 3 B 5 2 C 
S4 
S41 7 D E 3 0 6 9 A 1 2 8 5 B C 4 F 
S42 D 8 B 5 6 F 0 3 4 7 2 C 1 A E 9 
S43 A 6 9 0 C B 7 D F 1 3 E 5 2 8 4 
S44 3 F 0 6 A 1 D 8 9 4 5 B C 7 2 E 
S5 
S51 2 C 4 1 7 A B 6 8 5 3 F D 0 E 9 
S52 E B 2 C 4 7 D 1 5 0 F A 3 9 8 6 
S53 4 2 1 B A D 7 8 F 9 C 5 6 3 0 E 
S54 B 8 C 7 1 E 2 D 6 F 0 9 A 4 5 3 
S6 
S61 C 1 A F 9 2 6 8 0 D 3 4 E 7 5 B 
S62 A F 4 2 7 C 9 5 6 1 D E 0 B 3 8 
S63 9 E F 5 2 8 C 3 7 0 4 A 1 D B 6 
S64 4 3 2 C 9 5 F A B E 1 7 6 0 8 D 
S7 
S71 4 B 2 E F 0 8 D 3 C 9 7 5 A 6 1 
S72 D 0 B 7 4 9 1 A E 3 5 C 2 F 8 6 
S73 1 4 B D C 3 7 E A F 6 8 0 5 2 9 
S74 6 B D 8 1 4 A 7 9 5 0 F E 2 3 C 
S8 
S81 D 2 8 4 6 F B 1 A 9 3 E 5 0 C 7 
S82 1 F D 8 A 3 7 4 C 5 6 B 0 F 9 2 
S83 7 B 4 1 9 C E 2 0 6 A D F 3 5 8 
S84 2 1 E 7 4 A 8 D F C 9 0 3 5 6 B 
Table 2.12    32 (8 x 4) DES S-Boxes 
Figure 2.15 shows how the blocks are subdivided and S-boxes used 
 
Figure 2.15: DES S-BOXES 
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2.5.1.3 DES Key Generation 
DES uses a 48 bits round key generated from the original 56 bits key of 
the cipher for each round. The key is entered in the form of 64 bits. By 
ignoring the last bit of each byte, 64 bits are 8 bytes, of the user supplied 
key, a 56 bits key is obtained.  The 56 bits key is first subjected to a 
permutation called permutation choice 1 (PC1). Then for each round, the 
56 bit key is divided into 2 halves 28 bits each. Each half is rotated left 1 
or 2 bits depending on the round. These shifted halves are the input to the 
next round. The 2 halves are then subjected to another permutation where 
only 48 bits are selected. This permutation is called permutation choice 2 
(PC2) shown in table 2.13. 
OBP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
IBP 14 17 11 24 1 5 3 28 15 6 21 10 
             
OBP 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
IPB 23 19 12 4 26 8 16 7 27 20 13 2 
             
OBP 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
IPB 41 52 31 37 47 55 30 40 51 45 33 48 
             
OBP 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
IPB 44 49 39 56 34 35 46 42 50 36 29 32 
Table 2.13: Permutation Choice 2. 
Figure 2.16 shows one round of key generation. 
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Figure 2.16: DES ROUND KEY SCHEDULING 
DES uses 16 rounds and hence 16 round sub keys are needed. 
2.5.1.4 DES Decryption 
DES decryption is done by passing the ciphertext through the structure 
with reversed order key. The initial and final permutations are inverse of 
each other and hence they do not affect the reversibility of the Feistel 
structure used for DES. 
2.5.1.5 DES Security and the need for a replacement 
DES was believed to be very secure until the early 1990s. It was not until 
that date when new attacks namely differential cryptanalysis (for details 
refer to the next chapter) were discovered, the only possible attack to DES 
before was brute force. 
By the end of the 1990s, it was noticed that computer power is increasing 
and brute force against DES is becoming feasible. It was clear that a 
replacement for DES was needed. Rijndael was selected as the AES in 
Oct-2000 and issued as FIPS, Federal Information Processing Standard, 
publication 197 in Nov-2001 (Rijndael will be presented at the end of this 
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chapter). A cipher which is widely accepted and used especially in open 
source environments is blowfish by Bruce Schneier, one of the 
cryptography leaders [28].  
2.5.2 Blowfish 
Blowfish was an attempt from Schneier to replace DES with an open, 
unpatented free, cipher for usage by the entire world. It is an urgent need 
for such a cipher as the US government restricts export of products using 
high key length ciphers to certain countries and regions in the world. Also 
patented ciphers are not to be used without permission from their owners. 
Hence Blowfish gained a great interest as being one of the first attempts 
to produce a free cipher. It also presents a new design method which will 
be described in section 8.2.5.6. 
2.5.2.1 Blowfish cipher description 
Blowfish is a variable-length key, 64-bit block cipher. The algorithm 
consists of two parts: a key expansion part and a data- encryption part. 
Key expansion converts a key of at most 448 bits into several sub key 
arrays totaling 4168 bytes. 
Data encryption occurs via a 16-round Feistel network. Each round 
consists of a key-dependent permutation, and a key- and data-dependent 
substitution. All operations are XORs and additions on 32-bit words. The 
only additional operations are four indexed array data lookups per round. 
Blowfish uses a large number of sub keys. These keys must be pre-
computed before any data encryption or decryption. The key field is 
represented as an array called P array which holds 18 sub key (P1, P2,..., 
P18) 32 bits each. There are 4 substitution boxes (S1, S2, S3, S4) 8 x 32 bits 
each.  
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2.5.2.2 Blowfish Encryption: 
Blowfish is a Feistel network consisting of 16 rounds. The input is a 64-
bit data element, x which is divided into two 32-bit halves: xL, xR. The 
flowing pseudo code shows how blow fish encryption is performed 
 
For i = 1 to 16 
    begin 
xL = xL XOR Pi 
xR = F(xL) XOR xR 
Swap xL and xR 
    end 
Swap xL and xR (Undo the last swap.) 
xR = xR XOR P17 
xL = xL XOR P18 
Recombine xL and xR 
 
2.5.2.3 Blow fish core Function F 
The core function is applied on the left half as follows, Divide xL into four 
eight-bit quarters: a, b, c, and d and then the operations of XOR and 
addition mod 232 are performed as shown in figure 2.17 
  
Figure 2.17: BLOWFISH CORE FUNCTION 
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2.5.2.4 Blowfish Decryption 
Decryption is exactly the same as encryption, except that P1, P2,..., P18 are 
used in the reverse order. 
Implementations of Blowfish that require the fastest speeds should unroll 
the loop and ensure that all sub keys are stored in cache. 
2.5.2.5 Blowfish key scheduling and S-Box generation 
The sub keys are calculated using the Blowfish algorithm. The exact 
method is as follows: 
1. Initialize first the P-array and then the four S-boxes, in order, with 
a fixed string. This string consists of the hexadecimal digits of pi 
(less the initial 3). For example: 
P1 = 0x243f6a88 
P2 = 0x85a308d3 
P3 = 0x13198a2e 
P4 = 0x03707344 
2. XOR P1 with the first 32 bits of the key, XOR P2 with the second 
32-bits of the key, and so on for all bits of the key (possibly up to 
P14). Repeatedly cycling through the key bits until the entire P-
array has been XORed with key bits. (For every short key, there is 
at least one equivalent longer key; for example, if A is a 64-bit 
key, then AA, AAA, etc., are equivalent keys.) 
3. Encrypt the all-zero string with the Blowfish algorithm, using the 
sub keys described in steps (1) and (2). 
4. Replace P1 and P2 with the output of step (3). 
5. Encrypt the output of step (3) using the Blowfish algorithm with 
the modified sub keys. 
6. Replace P3 and P4 with the output of step (5). 
7. Continue the process, replacing all entries of the P- array, and then 
all four S-boxes in order, with the output of the continuously-
changing Blowfish algorithm. 
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In total, 521 iterations (9, 18/2, for the P array + 512, 256*4/2, for the s-
boxes) are required to generate all required sub keys. Applications can 
store the sub keys rather than execute this derivation process multiple 
times. 
S-Box design in blow fish follows a random key dependent approach 
yielding a structure very hard to analyze for attacks like linear or 
differential attacks. 
2.5.2.6 Blowfish security 
The key dependent S-boxes and sub keys, generated using cipher itself, 
makes analysis very difficult.  
Provided key is large enough, brute-force key search is not practical, 
especially with the high key scheduling cost. 
2.5.3 Rijndael 
Rijndael [5], [6], and [29] is the new AES standard block cipher which 
replaced DES. The cipher is simple in structure and yet very secure. The 
designers of the cipher used a methodology to ensure great confusion and 
diffusion effects and their strategy was to use byte operations which are 
very fast to implement both in Hardware and Software. The structure of 
Rijndael follows a substitution permutation network structure but first the 
input block is arranged into a square of bytes. The structure is inspired by 
a previous cipher designed by the authors of Rijndael and Knudsen called 
square cipher [30]. 
2.5.3.1 Rijndael Cipher Structure 
Rijndael is an iterated cipher that accepts data block of 128 bits and a key 
of 128, 192, or 256 bits. The number of rounds depends on the key length. 
The basic version of 128 bits key is described here. 
In this version the cipher consists of 9 rounds plus an extra last round.  
Each regular round involves four steps. First is the Byte Substitution step, 
where each byte of the block is replaced by its substitute in an S-box. 
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The S-box itself was very cleverly designed to overcome known attacks 
exploiting S-Boxes of DES and similar ciphers, namely differential, 
linear, and interpolation attacks. 
The S-box here is a )2()2( 88 GFGF   mapping. They first used the 
inverse of input in GF(28). 
a(x)=x-1 in GF(28) with polynomial basis with the irreducible polynomial  
1)( 348  xxxxxm  
0 is mapped to itself as it does not have an inverse. 
This mapping is already shown to be non vulnerable to linear or 
differential cryptanalysis by Nyberg [31]. 
Then an affine transform is performed to rise up the degree of the overall 
system to overcome the interpolation attack [32].  
The transform used is  
)1mod()1)(()()( 84567267  xxxxxxaxxxxxb  
Rijndael designers performed the above transform on all possible values 
of 8 bits and came up with am S-Box which is 8 x 8 mapping for the sake 
of performance. The S-box and it inverse are shown in tables 2.14 and 
2.15 respectively (hexadecimal values are presented). The tables should 
be read from left to right up down for the input output mapping performed 
by s-boxes for inputs in sequence from 00 to ff (in hexadecimal). 
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63 7C 77 7B F2 6B 6F C5 30 01 67 2B FE D7 AB 76 
CA 82 C9 7D FA 59 47 F0 AD D4 A2 AF 9C A4 72 C0 
B7 FD 93 26 36 3F F7 CC 34 A5 E5 F1 71 D8 31 15 
04 C7 23 C3 18 96 05 9A 07 12 80 E2 EB 27 B2 75 
09 83 2C 1A 1B 6E 5A A0 52 3B D6 B3 29 E3 2F 84 
53 D1 00 ED 20 FC B1 5B 6A CB BE 39 4A 4C 58 CF 
D0 EF AA FB 43 4D 33 85 45 F9 02 7F 50 3C 9F A8 
51 A3 40 8F 92 9D 38 F5 BC B6 DA 21 10 FF F3 D2 
CD 0C 13 EC 5F 97 44 17 C4 A7 7E 3D 64 5D 19 73 
60 81 4F DC 22 2A 90 88 46 EE B8 14 DE 5E 0B DB 
E0 32 3A 0A 49 06 24 5C C2 D3 AC 62 91 95 E4 79 
E7 C8 37 6D 8D D5 4E A9 6C 56 F4 EA 65 7A AE 08 
BA 78 25 2E 1C A6 B4 C6 E8 DD 74 1F 4B BD 8B 8A 
70 3E B5 66 48 03 F6 0E 61 35 57 B9 86 C1 1D 9E 
E1 F8 98 11 69 D9 8E 94 9B 1E 87 E9 CE 55 28 DF 
8C A1 89 0D BF E6 42 68 41 99 2D 0F B0 54 BB 16  
Table 2.14: Rijndael S-Box 
52 09 6A D5 30 36 A5 38 BF 40 A3 9E 81 F3 D7 FB 
7C E3 39 82 9B 2F FF 87 34 8E 43 44 C4 DE E9 CB 
54 7B 94 32 A6 C2 23 3D EE 4C 95 0B 42 FA C3 4E 
08 2E A1 66 28 D9 24 B2 76 5B A2 49 6D 8B D1 25 
72 F8 F6 64 86 68 98 16 D4 A4 5C CC 5D 65 B6 92 
6C 70 48 50 FD ED B9 DA 5E 15 46 57 A7 8D 9D 84 
90 D8 AB 00 8C BC D3 0A F7 E4 58 05 B8 B3 45 06 
D0 2C 1E 8F CA 3F 0F 02 C1 AF BD 03 01 13 8A 6B 
3A 91 11 41 4F 67 DC EA 97 F2 CF CE F0 B4 E6 73 
96 AC 74 22 E7 AD 35 85 E2 F9 37 E8 1C 75 DF 6E 
47 F1 1A 71 1D 29 C5 89 6F B7 62 0E AA 18 BE 1B 
FC 56 3E 4B C6 D2 79 20 9A DB C0 FE 78 CD 5A F4 
1F DD A8 33 88 07 C7 31 B1 12 10 59 27 80 EC 5F 
60 51 7F A9 19 B5 4A 0D 2D E5 7A 9F 93 C9 9C EF 
A0 E0 3B 4D AE 2A F5 B0 C8 EB BB 3C 83 53 99 61 
17 2B 04 7E BA 77 D6 26 E1 69 14 63 55 21 0C 7D 
Table 2.15: Rijndael Inverse S-Box 
The input block which is 128 bits or 16 bytes is arranged in the form of a 
4 x 4 square byte matrix and substitution is made on each byte. 
The next stage of Rijndael is a shift row operation where each row of the 
square 4 x 4 substitution is rotated as follows 
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From  To 
1 5 9 13  1 5 9 13 
2 6 10 14  6 10 14 2 
3 7 11 15  11 15 3 7 
4 8 12 16  16 4 8 12 
 
Where the first row is not shifted while the second is rotated one byte to 
the left, the third two bytes, and the fourth 3 bytes. 
This operation introduces permutation and hence diffusion. 
The third stage is a Mix Column operation where addition and 
multiplication in GF(28) of each column is performed resulting that each 
byte is a function in all the column four bytes. The mix column is defined 
as a matrix multiplication in GF(28) with polynomial basis, the same 
polynomial used to generate the s-boxes.  
The result of the shift row matrix is multiplicated with the following 
matrix 
2 3 1 1 
1 2 3 1 
1 1 2 3 
3 1 1 2 
And the result is finally mixed with the round key, 128 bits, using XOR. 
Before introducing the plaintext block to the first round it is mixed with 
the user input key and after the last round an extra round without the mix 
column stage is applied. 
The entire cipher components are reversible and hence the entire cipher is 
reversible. 
Figure 2.18 represents a 3D illustration of Rijndael round, while figure 
2.19 is a conventional illustration which represents the SPN structure of 
Rijndael. 
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Figure 2.18: 3D ILLUSTRATION OF A RIJNDAEL ROUND 
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Figure 2.19: RIJNDAEL ROUND 
2.5.3.2 Rijndael Key Scheduling 
Rijndael needs a 128 bit key for each round. The sub key material, which 
consists of all the round keys in order, consists of the original key, 
followed by stretches. 
Each stretch is of the length of the original key, consisting of 4 words 
four-byte each such that each word is the XOR of the preceding four byte 
word and either corresponding word in the previous stretch for all stretch 
word except the first one. 
For the first word in a stretch, the last word of the previous stretch is first 
rotated one byte to the left, and then its bytes are transformed using the S-
box from the Byte Substitution step, and then a round-dependent constant 
is XORed to its first byte. The result is XORed with the first word of thje 
previous stretch, see figure 2.20 
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The round constants are generated as successive powers of 3 in GF(28): 
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
27 54 108 216 171 77 154 47 
94 188 99 198 151 53 106 212 
179 125 250 239 197 145 57 114 
228 211 189 97 ...    
Successive powers of 3 in GF(28), unlike 2, include all the values from 1 
to 255, 3 is called primitive root, and thus several implementations of 
Rijndael use tables of the powers of 3, and the inverse table giving the 
discrete logarithm in that field, to facilitate calculations, but the round 
constants are still the powers of 2.  
 
Figure 2.20: RIJNDAEL KEY SCHEDULING 
2.5.3.3 Rijndael Decryption 
Decryption in Rijndael is performed by going backward in the structure 
with each operation reversed and keys in reverse order just like the basic 
SPN described. 
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2.5.3.4 Rijndael Security 
Rijndael is believed for the best knowledge to be very secure. Its design 
was based to defeat known cryptanalysis techniques known. A dedicated 
attack is the square attack developed by the authors of Rijndael, but it 
seems to attack only reduced versions up to 4 rounds.  
The main threat to Rijndael may be from the discovery of that Rijndael 
can be presented as a set of algebraic equations. Hence this property can 
be used with known plaintext to attack Rijndael. But the number of 
equations to be solved are quit large and no way has been discovered to 
solve them yet. 
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Chapter 3: Attacks on Block Ciphers 
3.1 Introduction 
ajor advances in the field of cryptanalysis have been 
developed. The DES cipher which was believed to be very 
secure faced a major challenge by the discovery of the 
differential cryptanalysis in 1991 [33]. Later linear cryptanalysis was 
discovered and applied to DES. More and more complicated and 
successful attacks were developed and applied to block cipher previously 
known to be secure. In the following sections, a detailed over view of 
attacks and some examples are given.  An extension to those attacks using 
artificial intelligence techniques will be addressed in the following 
chapters. 
3.2 Attack Complexity 
The complexity of the attack is a measure of how much resources is 
needed to mount the attack. The resources here mean the computational 
power or time and the amount of information needed in the form of 
plaintext, ciphertext, or both. It is always assumed that he algorithm of the 
encryption is known. Complexity can be measured by the number of 
encryptions and/ or decryptions needed to mount the attack. 
For example a cipher with b bits secret key can be attacked by trying all 
the possible values of the key which is called a brute force attack. Of 
course at least one plaintext – ciphertext pair has to be known to verify 
each value of the key. This attack is said to have 2b complexity. 
The required information is always used to classify the type of the attack 
as the following section explains. 
M 
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3.3 Types of Attacks 
Attacks on block ciphers can be classified based on the amount of 
required information to mount the attack. The following is a list of these 
types of attacks [2]. 
3.3.1 Known ciphertext only attack 
In this attack, the cryptanalyst only knows the encryption algorithm and 
the ciphertext to be decoded. The statistical attacks on classical ciphers 
described in chapter 2 are examples of known ciphertext only attacks. All 
modern block ciphers defeat this attack.  
3.3.2 Known plaintext attack 
In this attack, the cryptanalyst knows the encryption algorithm the 
ciphertext to be decoded, and one ore more plaintext – ciphertext pairs 
generated using the secret key. This type of information can be easily 
gained by previous knowledge of a certain pattern to occur in the 
ciphertext like in the case of encrypting an image file with predetermined 
structure and headers. Linear cryptanalysis is an example of known 
plaintext attack. Interpolation attack is another example, detailed in 
section 3.5. 
3.3.3 Chosen plaintext attack 
In this type of attack, the cryptanalyst is able to select certain plaintext 
and obtain the corresponding ciphertext using the secret key to be 
revealed. A good example of this type of attack is deferential 
cryptanalysis described later in section 3.4. The attacker chooses plaintext 
patterns that exploit the cipher structure and help to discover the key.  
3.3.4 Chosen ciphertext and chosen text attacks 
These types of attacks are less likely to be used or to obtain the 
information needed in an easy way, but there still a possibility to exploit 
cipher structure more efficiently if such information can be available. 
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A cipher is believed to be secure if it passes the known plaintext attack. 
3.4 Differential Cryptanalysis 
In this section, the application of differential cryptanalysis to the basic 
SPN cipher is described [7].  
3.4.1 Overview of the Differential Attack  
Differential cryptanalysis was developed by Biham and Shamir in early 
1990s primarily for DES [34], [35], and [33]. 
Differential cryptanalysis exploits the high probability of certain 
occurrences of plaintext differences and differences into the last round of 
an iterated cipher. 
For example, consider a system with input X = [X1 X2 ... Xn] and output Y 
= [Y1 Y2 ... Yn]. Let two inputs to the system be X and X with the 
corresponding outputs Y and Y, respectively. The input difference is 
given by X = X  X where "" represents a bit-wise exclusive-OR of 
the n-bit vectors and, hence,  
X= [X1 X2 ... Xn ]  
Where Xi= X X representing the ith bit of X' and X'', respectively.  
Similarly, Y = Y  Y is the output difference and  
Y= [Y1 Y2 ... Yn]  
Where Yi= Y Y 
In an ideally randomizing cipher, the probability that a particular output 
difference Y occurs given a particular input difference X is 1/2n where 
n is the number of bits of X. Differential cryptanalysis seeks to exploit a 
scenario where a particular Y occurs given a particular input difference 
X with a very high probability PD (i.e., much greater than 1/2n). The pair 
(X, Y) is referred to as a differential. Differential cryptanalysis is a 
chosen plaintext attack, meaning that, the attacker is able to select inputs 
and examine outputs in an attempt to derive the key. 
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3.4.2 Differential Cryptanalysis of the basic SPN  
In this section, the construction of a differential (X, Y) involving 
plaintext bits as represented by X and the input to the last round of the 
cipher as represented by Y for the basic SPN described in chapter 2 is 
investigated.  
For the SPN structure, the only nonlinear component is the S-Box, and 
the focus of the attack is on that component. Each S-Box is studied for its 
differential distribution. Then by combining all the active S-boxes 
differential distributions based on the SPN structure, a cipher differential 
characteristics is constructed. 
Using the high likely differential characteristic gives the opportunity to 
exploit information coming into the last round of the cipher to derive bits 
from the last round sub-keys.  
To find an S-Box difference distribution, the input and output differences 
of the S-boxes is considered in order to determine a high probability 
difference pair.  
3.4.2.1 Analyzing the Cipher Components  
Consider the 44 S-box representation of Figure 3.1 with input X = [X1 
X2 X3 X4] and output Y = [Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4].  
 
Figure 3.1: S-BOX MAPPING 
All difference pairs of an S-box, (X, Y), can be examined and the 
probability of Y given X can be derived by considering input pairs (X, 
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X) such that X  X = X. Since the ordering of the pair is not relevant, 
for a 44 S-box only consider all 16 values for X and then the value of 
X constrains the value of X to be X = X    X.  
The complete data for an S-box is tabulated in a difference distribution 
table in which the rows represent X values (in hexadecimal) and the 
columns represent Y values (in hexadecimal). The difference distribution 
table for the S-box S11 from chapter 2 is given in Table 3.1. Each element 
of the table represents the number of occurrences of the corresponding 
output difference Y value given the input difference X. Note that, 
besides the special case of (X = 0, Y = 0), the largest value in the table 
is 8, corresponding to X = B and Y = 2. Hence, the probability that Y 
= 2 given an arbitrary pair of input values that satisfy X = B is 8/16. The 
smallest value in the table is 0 and occurs for many difference pairs. In 
this case, the probability of the Y value occurring given the X value is 
0.   
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  Output Difference 
In
p
u
t D
ifferen
ce 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 4 2 0 0 
2 0 0 0 2 0 6 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
3 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 0 4 
4 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 4 2 0 0 0 
5 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 2 
6 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
7 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 2 
9 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 
A 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 
B 0 0 8 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
C 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 
D 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
E 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
F 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 2 0 
Table 3.1 Difference table for the first S-Box 
There are several general properties of the difference distribution table 
that should be mentioned. First, it should be noted that the sum of all 
elements in a row is 2n =16; similarly the sum of any column is 2n =16. 
Also, all element values are even (because if X', and X'' are reversed, the 
same result is given since X = X  X = X  X).  As well, the input 
difference of X = 0 must lead to an output difference of Y = 0 for the 
one-to-one mapping of the S-box. Hence, the top right corner of the table 
has a value of 2n = 16 and all other values in the first row and first column 
are 0. Finally, if an ideal S-box can be constructed, which gives no 
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differential information about the output given the input value, the S-box 
would have all elements in the table equal to 1 and the probability of 
occurrence of a particular value for Y given a particular value of X 
would be 1/2n = 1/16. However, as the properties discussed above must 
hold, this is clearly not achievable.   
Before proceeding to discuss the combining of S-box difference pairs to 
derive a good differential to use in the attack, the influence of the key on 
the S-box differential must be discussed. 
Let the input to the "un-keyed" S-box is X and the output is Y. 
However, in the cipher structure the keys applied at the input of each S-
box must be considered. In this case, if let the input to the "keyed" S-box 
be W = [W1 W2 W3 W4], and consider the input difference to the keyed 
S-box to be   
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represent the two keyed input values. Since the key bits remain the same 
for w' and w'', 
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Hence, the key bits have no influence on the input difference value and 
can be ignored. In other words, the keyed S-box has the same difference 
distribution table as the un-keyed S-box.  
Using the above equations, complete difference characteristics can be 
calculated for the SPN and hence differential attack can be mounted.  
3.4.2.2 Constructing Differential Characteristics  
After navigating through the SPN, with an input difference 00F0 
[0000,0000,1111,0000], difference in all bits for the input of the third S-
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Box, an input difference for the last round is expected to be 2157 
[0010,0001,0101,0111] with a probability of 3/1024, for details see 
chapter 4. 
3.4.2.3 Extracting Key Bits  
Once an R1 round differential characteristic is discovered for a cipher of 
R rounds with a suitably large enough probability, it is possible to attack 
the cipher by recovering bits from the last sub-key. In the case of our 
example, it is possible to extract bits from sub-key K5. The process 
followed involves partially decrypting the last round of the cipher and 
examining the input to the last round to determine if a right pair has 
probably occurred or not. The sub-key bits following the last round at the 
output of S-boxes in the last round influenced by non-zero differences in 
the differential output is referred as the target partial sub-key.  
A partial decryption is executed for each pair of cipher-text corresponding 
to the pairs of plaintext used to generate the input difference X for all 
possible target partial sub-key values. A count is kept for each value of 
the target partial sub-key value. The count is incremented when the 
difference for the input to the last round corresponds to the value 
expected from the differential characteristic. The partial sub-key value 
which has the largest count is assumed to indicate the correct value of the 
sub-key bits. This works because it is assumed that the correct partial sub-
key value will result in the expected differential characteristics. An 
incorrect sub-key is assumed to result in a relatively random effect at the 
bits entering the S-boxes of the last round then, the difference will not be 
as expected from the characteristic.  
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Results from implementing the attack are shown below for last round 
Sub-Key=1E4F  
Candidate Key Right Pairs out of 5000 
174F 5 
190F 5 
194D 5 
194F 8 
199F 5 
1E0F 6 
1E4D 6 
1E4F 12 
1E7F 5 
1E8F 6 
1E9F 9 
1ECF 8 
1EDF 7 
1EEF 8 
1EFF 7 
6ECF 5 
7ECF 5 
7EFF 6 
8ECF 5 
8EFF 6 
D944 5 
DE44 5 
EECF 5 
EEFF 7 
FE9F 5 
FEDF 5 
As can be seen, the correct key gives a very close match to the differential 
probability 0.24% (12/5000) compared to 0.293% (3/1024) as the 
calculated differential probability.  
3.4.2.4 Complexity of the Attack  
For differential cryptanalysis, the S-boxes involved in a characteristic 
which have a non-zero input difference (and hence a non-zero output 
difference) are called active S-boxes. In general the larger the 
probabilities of differentials to occur (of the active S-boxes), the larger the 
differential characteristic probability for the complete cipher. Also, the 
fewer active S-boxes, the larger the differential characteristic probability. 
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The data required to mount the attack is considered a measure of the 
complexity of the cryptanalysis.  
In general it is very complex to determine exactly the number of chosen 
plaintext pairs required to mount the attack. However, it can be shown 
that a good rule-of-thumb for the number of chosen plaintext pairs, ND, 
required to distinguish right pairs when trying sub-key candidates is   
ND=c / PD 
Where PD is the differential characteristic probability for the R-1 rounds 
of the R-round cipher and c is a small positive integer.  
The above equation simply indicates that a few occurrences of the right 
pair are enough to give a count to the correct target partial sub-key value 
that is significantly greater than the counts for the incorrect target partial 
sub-key values. Since a right pair is expected to occur for about every 
1/PD pairs examined, in practice, it is generally reasonable to use some 
small multiple of 1/ PD chosen plaintext pairs to successfully mount the 
attack. 
Approaches to provide resistance to differential cryptanalysis have been 
focused on the S-box properties (i.e., minimizing the difference pair 
probability of an S-box) and finding structures to maximize the number of 
active S-boxes. Rijndael is a good example of a cipher designed to 
provide high resistance to differential cryptanalysis.  
Probability PD is an estimate only. In practice, in many ciphers it has 
proven to be reasonably accurate [7].  
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3.5 Interpolation Cryptanalysis 
As deferential cryptanalysis gained so much interest, many works tried to 
extend the idea of differential cryptanalysis to attack more block ciphers 
not vulnerable to normal deferential cryptanalysis.  
In [37] Lai proposed a definition for higher order derivative of discrete 
functions, Later Knudsen used this to produce an attack known as higher 
deferential attack [32].  
In [32] Jakobsen et al demonstrated the idea of interpolation attack. The 
system proposed can be used to attack block ciphers of low algebraic 
degree by approximating the R-1 rounds of the cipher with a polynomial 
of some degree d. Using Lagrange or Newton interpolation methods (see 
appendix B), the attacker can calculate the coefficients of the 
interpolating polynomial and uses this polynomial to decide if a key value 
is eligible to be a correct one. The entire attack is based on the 
approximation of that a wrong guessed value of the last round key will 
produce a randomly distributed bit values that disagree with other known 
plaintext- ciphertext pairs not used to produce the interpolating 
polynomial. In the following sections, a brief description of the basic 
interpolation attack as presented in [32] and [38] is given. 
3.5.1 Description of the attack 
The interpolation attack is described as follows,  
The output of an R-1 round reduced cipher can be expressed as a 
polynomial ])[2()( xGFxp
m  of the plaintext. Assume that this 
polynomial has a degree d, hence has d+1 unknown coefficients, and also 
assume that d+2 plaintext/ciphertext pairs are available. For each value of 
the last round key, one can perform a decryption assuming that value of 
the key and constructs the interpolation polynomial using d+1 pairs using 
Lagrange or Newton interpolation. Then check for the output of the 
polynomial with the remaining pair. If the output matches then the correct 
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value of the last round key has been discovered with some high 
probability by reasoning. The attack depends on the following theorem, 
 
Theorem 3.1 
Assume that the interpolating polynomial obtained from a wrongly 
guessed value of the last round key will produce a random output and 
uniformly distributed over the output bits when tried with other known 
plaintext – partially decrypted text pair, then there exist an interpolation 
attack to the cipher at hand such that the last round key value is obtained 
by dropping out the values of the wrong key. 
 
A simplified proof to the above theorem is given here, 
Proof. 
Now let y be the output of the cipher given a particular input x and y~ be 
the partially decrypted cipher-text with the correct value of the key K and 
let y~ be the one obtained by a wrong guess of the key, and assume that 
the last round function mapping is g(.) , note that the round as hole is 
considered not the core function and is reversible, then 
),(~ 1 ykgy   (3.3) 
))~,(,(),(~ 11 ykgkgykgy    (3.4) 
Then the difference between the two values is the difference between 
applying the last round function twice, one with a correct key and the 
inverse with a wrong one, then from the nature of the cipher round 
mapping and its strong confusion and diffusion characteristics, this 
difference is expected to occur randomly and uniformly distributed over 
the output bits and hence one will unlikely be able to find an interpolating 
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polynomial that finds the correct mapping for the R-1 rounds block 
cipher. 
It was demonstrated how to use of the interpolation attack on many cipher 
proven to be secure against the linear or differential cryptanalysis [32]. 
The interpolation attack is only applicable to ciphers which can be 
represented with low algebraic degree polynomials, and hence its round 
function must not be very complicated. One of the ciphers attacked in 
[32] was the Knudsen-Nyberg cipher with a round function described as  
)))(((),( kxehdkxF  , where 3)( xxh   in GF(233) and e is an affine 
extension combination of the input bits )2()2(:
3332 GFGFe  and d is a 
discarding transform as )2()2(:
3233 GFGFd  . 
As can be seen the degree of the round function is a little bit small. 
In Rijndael [6], Daemen and Rjimen used an affine transform of degree 7 
to overcome the interpolation attack and they have succeeded (see chapter 
2 and appendix B for details).  
3.5.2 Complexity of the attack 
The complexity of the attack is based on the number of pairs needed to 
perform the interpolation. For each interpolation, to be completed, n+1 
pairs of plaintext- ciphertext are needed where n is the number of non-
zero coefficients in the target polynomial and generally dn  . If the last 
round key is b bits, then the attack complexity is 2b(n+1). The attack can 
be extended into a chosen plaintext attack where some of the input bits 
may be set to zero and the polynomial is only representing a function of 
the other input bits. 
 
There are much more attacks developed along the years, such as Square 
Attacks, Higher and Truncated differential attacks and more. Refer to [2], 
[38] and [9] for details 
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Chapter 4: Genetic Algorithm Cryptanalysis 
he cryptanalysis problem can be modeled as a search problem, in 
principle, through the key space. Brute force attack can be 
viewed as a linear search for the target key. The security of a 
cipher is measured based on the complexity of the type of attacks to this 
particular cipher system as described in the previous chapter. Many 
researches have been developed in the direction of the reduction of the 
complexity of the attacks on different cipher systems, differential 
cryptanalysis is an example. 
Genetic algorithms (GA), see appendix A, is an attractive scope for 
cryptanalysis. Genetic algorithms can be modeled as a guided random 
search in the problem space, where upon the completion of each 
generation in a genetic algorithm process, better solutions to the problem 
at hand are found, and by the end of the process almost the best solution 
is found.  
The main problem of using a genetic algorithm in cryptanalysis is to find 
a fitness measure of how close a candidate key is to the target key. 
A candidate key is a key value under judgment in a key search attack on a 
cipher.  
A target key is the correct key value that needs to be found as a target of 
an attack on a particular cipher. 
The possibility of using the genetic algorithm in key search is very 
attractive due to the ability of genetic algorithm to reduce the complexity 
of the search problem. 
The problem again is to find such fitness measure. Of course one of the 
direct measures, may be the inverse of the Euclidian distance between the 
candidate key and the target key, but since the target key is unknown, 
then this distance can not be calculated. Also due to the confusion effect 
T 
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of modern block ciphers, there is no simple relation of a candidate key 
and the number of correct bits in a ciphertext. 
This work tries to find a fitness measure based on the differential 
catachrestic of a cipher. In other words, the differential cryptanalysis 
technique will be enhanced, performance wise, using genetic algorithms. 
The following sections introduce a frame work of how to use genetic 
algorithms in cryptanalysis, an overview of previous work in this field 
and proposal for new technique. The proposed solution is applied to both 
of the generic block ciphers models, the SPN and the FN. 
4.1 Genetic Algorithm in Cryptanalysis, a Framework 
The cryptanalysis problem, as mentioned before, can be modeled as the 
fittest key, the most close to the target key, search in the scope of genetic 
algorithms. 
Three problems have to be addressed first before a framework can be 
achieved. 
1. Candidate key representation as a chromosome in the scope of GA 
2. Fitness Measure of how close a candidate key is to the target key 
3. A stooping condition to stop the genetic algorithms evolutionary 
process. 
In section 4.3, a proposal for the solution of these three problems is given. 
Figure 4.1 shows a flowchart of the cryptanalysis problem as a genetic 
algorithm fitness maximization problem, assuming the mentioned three 
problems had been addressed. 
77 
 
Figure 4.1: CRYPTANALYSIS MODELED AS A GENETIC ALGORITHM 
PROBLEM 
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4.2 Previous Attempts to Use Genetic Algorithms in Cryptanalysis 
Several attempts to use genetic algorithms were made, [39], [40], and 
[41]. The three attacks were targeted to simple classical symmetric key 
ciphers (Simple Substitution Cipher, Three Rotor Machine Cipher, and 
Simple Transposition Cipher respectively) and their fitness measure was 
based on the statistical analysis of the ciphertext knowing its target 
language. In all of these simple cases, a population of candidate keys 
were generated. A fitness measure based on the statistical properties 
(frequency of letters, diagrams, and trigrams as defined in chapter 2) 
compared to the target language, English in all three cases, was 
calculated. Genetic algorithm was then applied for a fixed number of 
generations and hopefully at the end the target key is found. 
As all modern ciphers hide the statistical information of plaintext and they 
do not propagate to the ciphertext and hence all of the previous mentioned 
works have no real application actually, then a new fitness measure is 
required. 
4.3 Genetic Algorithm Cryptanalysis of the Basic SPN 
One of the most powerful cryptanalysis techniques developed was the 
differential cryptanalysis described earlier. As we concluded, the 
complexity of the attack was reduced from 2N to R*2n where N is the 
entire key length while n is the sub-key length and R is the number of 
rounds of the cipher. In the example of the SPN in chapter 3, N=80 and 
n=16, and R=5. Still it is highly complex, since for each candidate sub-
key, a huge number of encryption and decryption operations must be 
carried out. In this work a trial to reduce the complexity of the differential 
attack is given. Genetic algorithm is used to generate new keys directed to 
the correct target key by using the match of the candidate sub-key 
differential characteristics and that of the system as the fitness measure. 
The technique described after is found to reduce the complexity of the 
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attack by at least 25% due to several experiments on the success of the 
attack. 
4.3.1 Problem formulation 
The use of such attractive technique, namely the genetic algorithms, has 
not been studied due to the difficult formulation of the cryptanalysis 
problem into a genetic algorithm optimization problem. 
As mentioned previously, three problems arise in the use of the genetic 
algorithms in cryptanalysis. 
1. Key representation. 
2. Fitness Measure. 
3. Stopping criteria of the Genetic algorithm search technique. 
4.3.2 Key Representation 
The problem of key representation is inherently solved by using binary 
genetic algorithm, as the string used to represent a chromosome is a 
binary stream of bits, and the key is also a binary word. The crossover 
and mutation processes are applied directly on the candidate keys to 
generate new keys directed to the correct key via the fitness measure. 
4.3.3 Fitness Measure 
The fitness function chosen is the main factor of the genetic algorithm. 
The differential characteristic of the cipher is used as a fitness measure, 
that is a key that gives good differentials, has a better fitness than the 
others. This characteristic has the advantage of being language 
independent and no statistical information of the language is anymore 
required. 
So the fitness function can be represented by a number F 
M
d
F    (4.1) 
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Where d is a count that is kept for each value of the target partial sub-key 
value and M is the total number of plaintext pairs used to evaluate the 
keys with a fixed difference. The count will be incremented when the 
difference for the input to the last round corresponds to the value 
expected from the differential characteristic. This works because it is 
assumed that the correct partial sub-key value will result in the difference 
to the last round being as frequent as expected from the characteristic 
since the characteristic has a high probability of occurring. An incorrect 
sub-key is assumed to result in a relatively random guess at the bits 
entering the S-boxes of the last round. 
4.3.4 Constructing the differential characteristics of the SPN 
As described, the differential characteristics of the SPN is used in the 
measure of fitness in a genetic algorithm cryptanalysis as proposed, and 
hence it must be constructed first. 
Once the differential information has been compiled for the S-boxes in an 
SPN, useful differential characteristics will be determined for the overall 
system. This can be done by combining appropriate difference pairs of S-
boxes.  
Consider a differential characteristic involving S13, S22, S32, S33 and S34 
(visualized in Figure 4.2). The diagram illustrates the influence of non-
zero differences in bits as they travel through the network, highlighting 
the S-boxes that may be considered as active. Note that this develops a 
differential characteristic for the first 3 rounds of the cipher and not the 
full 4 rounds.  
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Figure 4.2: DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SPN 
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From the diagram, it is apparent that the active S-Boxes are as follows 
(with difference pairs and probability of occurrence shown) 
Active S-Box Input Difference Output Difference Probability 
S13 F 4 8/16 
S22 2 7 4/16 
S32 4 3 6/16 
S33 B 1 4/16 
S34 4 7 4/16 
 
All other S-boxes will have zero input difference and consequently zero 
output difference. The input difference to the cipher is equivalent to the 
input difference to the first round and is given by  
X= [0000 0000 1111 0000]  
Let Ui represent the input difference to the ith round then 
2157
0444
0200
000
000
4
3
2
1





U
U
U
FU
FX
 
In determining the probability, given plaintext difference X, it is 
assumed that the differential of each round is independent of the 
differential of other rounds, hence, the probability of occurring is 
determined by the product of the probabilities.  
A probability of 8/16  4/16  (6/16*4/16*4/6) = 3/1024 given plaintext 
difference X, where again it has been assumed the independence 
between the difference pairs of S-boxes in the same round. During the 
cryptanalysis process, many pairs of plaintexts for which X = [0000 
0000 1111 0000] will be encrypted. With high probability, 3/1024, the 
differential characteristic illustrated will occur. Such pairs for X are 
called right pairs. Plaintext difference pairs for which the characteristic 
does not occur are referred to as wrong pairs.  
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4.3.5 Stopping Criteria 
This is one of the classical problems in genetic algorithms, that is when to 
stop the process of GA. The problem at hand really needs a stopping 
criterion that can be used. 
The one chosen here, a classical choice, is when the algorithm can 
generate no more better solutions for a number of generations. 
Let PD be the differential probability of the given SPN then fitness should 
be DP where   is a positive number less than 1, taken 0.8 in this 
example. The maximum number of generations has been chosen in order 
that the total number of keys in all generations (S) not to exceed half of 
all possible sub-key value that is 
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4.3.6 Implementing the Attack 
The above mentioned points were taken into consideration and an 
implementation using object oriented C++ is developed. The idea behind 
using a native implementation instead of using a ready package for 
genetic algorithm is the search for optimized implementation of the attack 
and to get stick with bit-level implementation whenever it is possible. The 
basic SPN model described earlier is implemented also using object 
oriented modeling. Each S-Box is an object from a class called CSBox. 
Each object differs from the other in the lookup array used to get the 
output of the S-Box. 
Then every 4 objects are combined together in a quad-S-Box to represent 
the substitution of a round. Permutation is implemented as a bit shift 
operation for each bit of the input word. The next array shows how many 
positions should a bit be shifted right, negative values means a left shift. 
byte shifter[16]={0,3,6,9,-3,0,3,6,-6,-3,0,3,-9,-6,-3,0}; 
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The key is mixed using XOR operation and the SPN is implemented and 
tested to prove a very high throughput.  
The attack is implemented by generating independent 5 sub-keys 16-bit 
each to represent the target key. Then a difference for 5000 pair of 
plaintext of 00F0 is selected. The most probable difference is then 
calculated through the SPN, as in section 4.3.4. 
The first generation is generated randomly using a simple uniform 
random number generator, to cover the bit space of the last round sub-
key. 
Then for each chromosome, a candidate sub-key, the fitness is set to zero, 
then the entire test pairs are used and the output difference is compared to 
the expected differential. If the correct difference is found the fitness 
value is incremented and finally normalized to the number of pairs. 
The genetic algorithm then goes in the normal way to generate new 
generations. The roulette wheel is used as a selection method. The 
algorithm is stopped based on the criteria described earlier. 
The algorithm has been implemented to get key bits of the last round; 
essentially the attack shall continue upward to get the entire key bits. See 
figure 4.3 for a flowchart of the proposed cryptanalysis technique. Note 
the similarity to figure 4.1 and the extra details given here in the fitness 
measure and stopping conditions. 
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Figure 4.3: GENETIC ALGORITHM CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE BASIC SPN 
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4.3.7 Experimental Results 
The attack had been tested several times on different keys. 
The following table shows a sample of the attack to get the bits of the last 
round sub-key, in this example it was 8F6E, corresponding to difference 
of 00F0 in the input. The differential probability of the SPN with input 
difference 00F0 is 3/1024. In our example, we have used 5000 pair 
plaintext means that a correct sub-key should produce about 15 of correct 
output differences. 
The genetic algorithm parameters were 
Chromosome Size:   16 bits 
Population Size:   1024 chromosomes 
Maximum Number of generations: 16 generations  
Crossover probability:  25% 
Mutation probability:   1% 
The table below shows the generations together with the best solution and 
its fitness. The test here went through the entire 16 generations while due 
to our stopping criteria it should have been stopped after generation 4. 
Key: 8F6E 
Generation Best Solution Fitness Normalized out of 
5000 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
 0   8F6C  0.0012 40.96% 
 1   8F6C  0.0012 40.96% 
 2   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 3   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 4   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 5   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 6   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 7   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 8   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 9   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 10   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 11   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 12   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 13   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 14   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
 15   8F6E  0.0024 81.92% 
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Other tests looked as follows 
Key: 2EA3 
Generation Best Solution Fitness Normalized out of 
5000 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
 0   2E23  0.0018 61.44% 
 1   2E23  0.0018 61.44% 
 2  2EA3  0.003 102.40% 
 3  2EA3  0.003 102.40% 
 4   2EA3  0.003 102.40% 
 
Key: 48BD 
Generation Best Solution Fitness Normalized out of 
3000 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
 0   78CA  0.001 34.13% 
 1   46BD  0.002 68.27% 
 2   46BD  0.002 68.27% 
 3   46BD  0.002 68.27% 
 4   46BD  0.002 68.27% 
 5   46BD  0.002 68.27% 
 6   46BD  0.002 68.27% 
 7   48BD  0.002667 91.02% 
 8   48BD  0.002667 91.02% 
 9   48BD  0.002667 91.02% 
Huge number of experiments had been carried out and in all experiments, 
the attack succeeded.  
It should be noticed from the tables given before that the differential 
probability is exceeded in some fitness calculations. This comes from the 
way the fitness is calculated by counting the right pairs and this count 
may not always be aligned, some extra pairs may have the fitness back 
under 100%. 
4.3.8 Complexity of the Attack 
As mentioned earlier, the attack is designed to reduce the complexity of 
the differential attack on SPN described in chapter 3. 
The reduction comes from, not to try all the sub keys but only part of 
them in each generation, 1024, in our case. 
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The number of chosen plaintext pairs is a major parameter. As mentioned 
in chapter 3, this count is given by  
ND=c / PD 
Where PD is the differential characteristic probability of the SPN, 3/1024 
in this example, and c is a positive integer. 
Many values had been tested for the ND value starting from 1024, adding 
1024 each time until ND reached 8192 or equivalent for 
c=3,6,9,12,15,18.21 and 24. Figure 4.2 shows the genetic evolving fitness 
for different ND normalized to the number of pairs. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Generation
F
it
n
e
s
s
 (
N
o
rm
a
li
z
e
d
)
1024 Pairs 2048 Pairs 3072 Pairs 4096 Pairs
5120 Pairs 6144 Pairs 7168 Pairs 8192 Pairs
 
Figure 4.4: FITNESS VALUE AGAINST GENERATION FOR DIFFERENT ND 
From the figure, it can be seen that similar behaviour is obtained for 
different number of pairs, when using 1024 pairs only (c=3); the system 
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does not converge to the correct key value. All experiments were allowed 
to run to the maximum number of generations. 
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4.4 Genetic Algorithm Cryptanalysis of a Feistel Ciphers 
In this section a proposal to reduce the complexity of the differential 
attack on Feistel ciphers using the genetic algorithms is proposed. GA is 
used to generate new keys directed to the correct key by the matching the 
candidate sub-key differential characteristics and that of the system as the 
fitness measure. Experiments showed that the technique described 
reduces the complexity of the attack by at least 25%. The Feistel structure 
is more complicated than the SPN structure in the previous section and 
hence it is worth to give a detailed description. 
4.4.1 The Considered Feistel Cipher 
A 5 round Feistel cipher similar to figure 2.6 is considered. This structure 
has 4 sub keys. The round function F of this cipher is chosen to be 
identical to the round function of the basic Substitution Permutation 
Network (SPN) described in chapter 3. One round of this cipher is shown 
in figure 4.5 
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Figure 4.5: ONE ROUND OF THE TEST FEISTEL CIPHER 
 
From the figure, the key is mixed with the input using bitwise XOR 
function. A substitution, n to n mapping, is performed. This substitution is 
changed from  round to the other. 
Finally a bit permutation is performed on the block. In this case n=16 bits 
is chosen. For substitution, 4 S boxes from the DES block cipher are 
selected for each round. 
The key is also 16 bits and 4 independent sub keys are used which resuls 
in a 64 bits length key. The overall block size is 32 bits. This structure is 
more complicated than the basic SPN described earlier. This structure is 
called DES like block cipher. Figure 4.6 shows the details of one round 
function. 
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In this cipher, the 16-bit data block is broken into four sub-blocks 4-bits 
each. Each sub-block forms an input to a 4x4 S-box (a substitution with 4 
input and 4 output bits), which can be easily implemented with a lookup 
table of sixteen 4-bit values, indexed by the integer represented by the 4 
input bits (see table 2.1). The permutation portion of a round is simply the 
transposition of the bits or the permutation of the bit positions. Figure 4.7 
shows the entire cipher. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: CORE FUNCTION F 
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Figure 4.7: FEISTEL CIPHER UNDER ATTACK 
4.4.2 Differential Cryptanalysis of the Feistel Cipher  
The analysis of the basic SPN differential characteristics as described in 
the chapter 3 can be applied in the same way to the Feistel cipher 
structure, but the analysis is little bit complicated. 
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Consider Figure 4.8 of the ith round in Feistel cipher where the key is first 
mixed with the input to the core function F using bitwise XOR. 
  
Figure 4.8: FEISTEL CIPHER ROUND WITH KEY MIXED BY XOR 
Figure 4.8 is a special case of figure 2.7 where the key is applied to the 
input and then a non-linear function F is applied to the keyed input. This 
implementation yields an output dependant on both the input and the key. 
The implementation of figure 4.8 is the most widely used way in many 
modern block ciphers, see chapter 2 for DES. 
Now the description of how to deduce the differential characteristics of 
the Feistel cipher is presented. 
Consider a Feistel cipher with a round similar to the one given above in 
figure 4.8, let two inputs X', Li-1' Ri-1', and X'', Li-1'' Ri-1'', be presented to 
the inputs of the round using the same key Ki. 
Then the difference in the input to the round can be calculated by xoring 
the two inputs X' and X'' as described earlier. 
i
R
i
Laiaiii
iiii
i
XXRRLL
RLRLXXX




|'''|'''
''|'''|''''
11
1111
 (4.2) 
Now turn to the output 
i
R
i
Liiii
i YYRLRLYYY  |''|'''|''''  (4.3) 
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It can be seen that iR
i
L XY   directly from the Feistel structure. 
For the right half, then  
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Now the output difference of the round depends on the output difference 
of the core function. 
Consider a similar analysis to the one given in section 4.3, it can be seen 
that for the core function with input difference 
i
R
i
F XX  as the key 
bits vanishes in the XOR operation, the output difference is FY  can be 
obtained with a high probability if the components of the core function F 
are differentially analyzed.  
Let )(
i
R
i
F XY  be the output difference of the core function F given the 
right half input difference 
i
RX  then the i
th round output difference as a 
function of the round input difference and the core function output 
difference can be written as 
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The above equation can then be used to construct complete differential 
characteristics of the Feistel cipher knowing its core function differential 
characteristics in similar way as in the case of the SPN. 
4.4.3 Constructing the differential characteristics of the Feistel 
Cipher 
As in SPN, a chosen difference is applied and navigated through the 
structure, 
Let the difference be 000000f0, i.e. the difference in the least significant 
byte of the right half (all numbers in hexadecimal). 
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Then the only active S-Box is S13 with input difference f and a probable 
output difference of 4. 
For that difference an expected output from the first round is 0040 which 
becomes 0020 after permutation. 
After mixing with the left half (using bit wise XOR), the output difference 
for the output right half is 0020, as the left half difference is 0000. 
Using the same notation used in the SPN, then the differences as 
propagated are as follows, 
4035704
4020004
0020000
0000000
0000000
4
3
2
1
BU
BU
FU
FU
FX





 
Active S-Boxes are listed below 
Active S-Box Input Difference Output Difference Probability 
S13 F 4 8/16 
S22 2 7 4/16 
S32 4 3 6/16 
S33 B 1 4/16 
S34 4 7 4/16 
Then the expected input difference to the last round is 04B40357 with a 
probability (as before multiplying all the probability assuming 
independence) is 8/16*4/16*6/16*4/16*4/16=3/1024. The construction is 
visualized in figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9: DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE TEST CIPHER 
4.4.4 Problem Formulation in Genetic Form 
As in the case of the SPN attack using genetic algorithm, three problems 
arise 
1. Key representation. 
2. Fitness Measure. 
3. Stopping criteria of the Genetic algorithm search technique. 
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In the previous section solutions to these three problems have been 
proposed, and these proposals are used here. 
4.4.5 Implementing the Attack  
The attack is implemented by generating independent 4 sub-keys 16-bit 
each to represent the target key. Then a difference is selected and 5120 
(5*1024) pairs of plaintext with that difference are generated, in our case 
it is 000000F0, the most probable difference to the last round is then 
calculated through the cipher as described previously and is expected to 
be 04B40357. 
Only the right half of the difference is considered during the attack as the 
candidate sub-key only affects that half, while the left half is independent 
on the key and so it is not considered. 
The first generation is generated randomly using a simple uniform 
random number generator, to cover the bit space of the last round sub-
key. Then for each chromosome, a candidate sub-key, at start the fitness 
is set to zero, then the entire test pairs are used and the output difference 
is compared to the expected differential. If the correct difference is found 
the fitness value is incremented and finally normalized to the number of 
pairs. 
The genetic algorithm then goes in the normal way to generate new 
generations. The roulette wheel is used as a selection method. The 
algorithm is stopped based on the criteria described earlier. That is when 
the algorithm can generate no more better solutions for a number of 
generations. 
Let PD be the differential probability of the given SPN then fitness should 
be DP where   is a positive number less than 1, taken 0.8 in this 
example. The maximum number of generations has been chosen in order 
that the total number of keys in all generations (S) not to exceed half of 
all possible sub-key value that is 
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The algorithm has been implemented to get key bits of the last round; 
essentially the attack shall continue upward to get the entire key bits. 
4.4.6 Experimental Results 
The attack had been implemented several times, 
The genetic algorithm parameters were 
Chromosome Size:   16 bits 
Population Size:   1024 
Maximum Number of generations: 16  
Crossover probability:  25% 
Mutation probability:   1% 
 
The table below shows the generations together with the best solution and 
its fitness. (Full 16 generation results are shown instead of stopping at 
generation 8) 
Key: 8BC4 
Generation Best Solution Fitness normalized out of 
5120 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
 0  9BC5  0.000781 26.66% 
 1  8B75  0.000977 33.35% 
 2  8BC5  0.001758 60.01% 
 3  8BC5  0.001758 60.01% 
 4  8BC5  0.001758 60.01% 
 5  8BC5  0.001758 60.01% 
 6  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 7  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 8  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 9  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 10  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 11  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 12  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 13  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 14  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
 15  8BC4  0.003125 106.67% 
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Other tests looked as follows 
73F7 
Generation Best Solution Fitness normalized out of 
5120 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
0  83F7  0.001367 46.66% 
1  C3F7  0.001563 53.35% 
2  E3F7  0.002148 73.32% 
3  23F7  0.002148 73.32% 
4  33F7  0.002148 73.32% 
5  73F7  0.003125 106.67% 
6  73F7  0.003125 106.67% 
7  73F7  0.003125 106.67% 
 
B3CC 
Generation Best Solution Fitness normalized out of 
5120 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
0  A34C  0.001758 60.01% 
1  A34C  0.001758 60.01% 
2  A3CC  0.002734 93.32% 
3  A3CC  0.002734 93.32% 
4  B3CC  0.003125 106.67% 
5  B3CC  0.003125 106.67% 
6  B3CC  0.003125 106.67% 
11D2 
Generation Best Solution Fitness normalized out of 
5120 
Percentage of differential 
probability 
0  16DE  0.000781 26.66% 
1  11D0  0.001172 40.00% 
2  11D2  0.002734 93.32% 
3  11D2  0.002734 93.32% 
4  11D2  0.002734 93.32% 
The results obtained earlier are similar to that of the SPN. 
It is worth some comments on the result tables given before. Again the 
fitness may exceed the differential probability due to the way of 
calculating the fitness by counting. 
In the second table (of 73F7 key) the fitness was constant for generations 
2, 3, and 4 but the process did not stop because the fitness didn't exceed 
the 80% of the differential probability. The GA is stopped after the 7th 
generation instead. Also in the third table (of B3CC key), The fitness 
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exceeded the 80% percentage (93.32%) at the second generation but only 
for two generations, 2 and 3, so the GA didn't stop until a fixed fitness for 
3 generations (4, 5, and 6) is observed. 
It is concluded from both results that the proposed genetic algorithm 
attack can be applied on any cipher vulnerable to differential attack based 
on that its differential characteristics is discovered. The proposed attack 
outperforms the differential attack as the number of keys being tried is 
much less than that of the differential attack. The reduction is guaranteed 
to be at least by 25% if the attack succeeds (16 generations 1024 sub-key 
each results a total of 16384 sub keys tried out of all sub-keys of 
216=65536) 
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Chapter 5: Neural Network Cryptanalysis 
eural networks, see appendix A, have proven to be very 
efficient in many problems. One of these problems is function 
approximation. Unlike interpolation, neural networks can 
approximate large degree algebraic functions through simple iterative 
process called learning, while in interpolation, a huge number of 
equations have to be solved or evaluated. This criterion of neural 
networks inspired its use in cryptanalysis as a natural extension to 
interpolation attack. In this chapter a hypothetical simplified cipher using 
a Feistel structure and using the Rijndael S-Box, known to be secured 
against interpolation attack, as its core function is used to address the 
neural network cryptanalysis. 
A short comparison between the proposed attack and interpolation attack 
is given. 
5.1 Universal Approximation 
Neural Networks can be used as universal mapping approximator. A fully 
connected feed forward network as shown in figure 5.1, trained with the 
back propagation algorithm can be viewed as a practical nonlinear input-
output mapping. This is inherited from a theory called Universal 
Approximation Theory, which can be viewed as a natural extension to the 
Weirstrass theorem developed in 1885, that states that any continuous 
function over a closed interval on the real axis can be expressed in that 
interval as an absolutely and uniformly convergent series of polynomials. 
Fourier series representation is a special type of that universal 
approximation. The Universal approximation theory is described as 
follows, 
Let (.) be a non constant bounded and a monotone-increasing continuous 
function. Then given any function f(x) where x is a vector in m 
N 
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dimensional hyper space, then there exists set of real numbers ai, bi and 
wij where i=1,2,….,n and j=1,2,….m  such that 
 
 

n
i
m
j
ijiji
bxwaxF
1 1
)()( 
  (5.1) 
as an approximation realization of the function f(.) where  
 )()( xfxF
 (5.2) 
for all x in the input space and  is a small positive constant. 
The universal approximation theory is directly applicable to the feed 
forward multi layer neural network with back propagation algorithm [42]. 
The same concept can be used to approximate any block cipher which is 
considered as a n-n discrete mapping between the input plaintext space 
and the output cipher-text space. 
 
Figure 5.1: THREE LAYERS FULLY CONNECTED FEED FORWARD NEURAL 
NETWORK   
5.2 HypCipher 
In this section, a hypothetical Feistel type cipher is used where the round 
function f is chosen from the AES [5], [6] cipher, the round function is a 
mapping in the GF(28) where this mapping is chosen of degree 8 and is 
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non vulnerable to either differential, linear or interpolation cryptanalysis. 
The AES is not structured like a Feistel cipher; rather it is a Substitution 
Permutation Network structure (SPN). The same concepts of the attack 
can be applied on SPNs. One round of the HypCipher is shown in figure 
5.2 
 
Figure 5.2: ONE ROUND OF THE HYPOTHETICAL CIPHER. 
As can be seen from the figure, the key is mixed with the input using 
bitwise XOR function. A substitution, n to n mapping, is performed. We 
used the S box from the AES block cipher which is defined to get x-1 in 
GF(28) with polynomial basis as  
)1mod()( 3481   xxxxxxa  
Then an affine transform is performed to rise up the degree of the overall 
system to overcome the interpolation attack [32].  
The transform used is  
)1mod()1)(()()( 84567267  xxxxxxaxxxxxb  . 
See chapter 2 for details. 
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The structure used here is more straight forward with respect to the 
Rijndael cipher and also has the same prosperities, that is still non 
vulnerable to differential, linear, and interpolation attacks. 
The described structure is going to be called HypCipher in the rest of this 
work. 
The round key is 8 bits and independent round sub-keys are used. The 
overall block size is 16 bits. The HypCipher described earlier is non 
vulnerable to all the mentioned attacks.  
5.3 Neural Network Attacks 
In this section, the proposed neural network attack is described. Let the 
description begins with the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1: Consider an iterated block cipher with block size m, Express 
the output of the round just before the last as an m-m mapping and use a 
neural network to approximate this mapping using a set of known 
plaintext – partially decoded cipher-text pairs obtained from a guessed 
value of the last round key. Further assume that the trained neural 
network obtained from a wrongly guessed values of the last round key 
will produce a random output and uniformly distributed over the output 
bits when tried with other known plaintext – partially decrypted text pair, 
then there exist a neural attack to the cipher at hand such that the last 
round key value is obtained by dropping out the values of the wrong key. 
 
Proof. 
Let y be the output of the cipher given a particular input x and y~ be the 
partially decrypted cipher-text with the correct value of the key K and let 
y~ be the one obtained by a wrong guess of the key, and assume that the 
last round function mapping is g(.) then 
),(~ 1 ykgy   (5.3) 
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))~,(,(),(~ 11 ykgkgykgy    (5.4) 
Then the difference between the two values )~~( yy   is the difference 
between applying the last round function twice, one with a correct key 
and the inverse with a wrong key, then from the nature of the cipher 
round function and its strong confusion and diffusion characteristics, this 
difference )~~( yy   is expected to occur randomly and uniformly 
distributed over the output bits and hence one will unlikely be able to find 
an approximating neural network that finds the correct mapping for the 
(R-1) rounds block cipher. 
In other words, a trained neural network with wrong guessed key value 
will actually be a random mapping that is not likely to guess values that 
were not trained by in a uniformly distributed environment. 
On the other hand, the correct key value will produce a robust mapping 
resulting in much lower errors when trying new values not used to train 
the network.  
5.3.1 Extracting Key Bits 
The attack is now quit obvious, a set of known plaintext – cipher-text 
pairs is constructed where part of that set is used to train a neural network, 
the training is performed between the input and the partially decrypted 
cipher-text to the last round using an assumption of the last round key. 
The rest of the set is used to test the output of the network and a record of 
the error between the actual output of the neural network and the real 
output is recorded. 
Each sub-key value is then tried and the minimum error key value is 
assumed to be the correct key or a local search can be done on the set of 
the minimum error values.  
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5.3.2 Example of applying the attack: 
The attack was implemented on several variants of the HypCipher 
described earlier, 
The network was chosen to be with one hidden layer. The Input size and 
the output layer size are inherited from the problem, recall that the neural 
network is going to learn the mapping produced by R-1 round of an R 
round iterated cipher. The input size is 16 and the output is only 8 since 
the right half of the cipher-text is the only half needed to be partially 
decrypted. 
The hidden layer size was taken to be also 16 neurons with sigmoidal 
activation function. Many researches have been carried out in the area of 
selecting the hidden layer size and the universal approximation theory 
tells a little about that. Many heuristics goes around selecting something 
between the input and output sizes like the multiplication or the addition 
average. The hidden layer can be viewed as a feature extraction or domain 
remapping, for that reason the hidden layer size was chosen to be 12 
neurons after some trails.  
A set of known plaintext cipher-text pairs was generated and used to 
implement the attack. The number of pairs used increases with the 
number of rounds, and the following linear relation  
ckRM   (5.5) 
can be used where M is the needed number of examples, R is the number 
of rounds and k, c are positive integers. The value of k depends on the 
algebraic degree of the cipher being attacked and a value of 1.5 of the 
degree of the cipher core function, 8 in our case, is found to give good 
results after some experiments. 
The extra examples (c) are used to evaluate the trained network for 
possible correct key values. 
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The attack succeeded in all the cases of 2 rounds variant to find the 
correct key value. For 3 and 4 rounds variants, a second hidden layer was 
found to make the attack successful. 
The following figures show the error produced by the neural network 
evaluating the extra examples using different key values. In figure 5.3, the 
correct last round key was (01100000) =96. The error value is calculated 
as the summed square error between the neural network output and the 
desired output.  As can be seen from the figure, the minimum error occurs 
at the correct key value 
Sigmoidal function followed by hard limiter where the final output is 
considered 1 if the neuron output exceeds 0.8 and 0 if the neuron output 
falls below 0.2 was used to represent the binary mapping at hand  
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Figure 5.3: RESULTS FOR 2 ROUNDS, KEY VALUE = 96. 
110 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0
1
4
2
8
4
2
5
6
7
0
8
4
9
8
1
1
2
1
2
6
1
4
0
1
5
4
1
6
8
1
8
2
1
9
6
2
1
0
2
2
4
2
3
8
2
5
2
Key Vlue
E
rr
o
r
 
Figure 5.4: RESULTS FOR 2 ROUNDS, KEY VALUE = 101. 
The results shown above in figure 5.3 and figure 5.4 were plotted as the 
neural network was trained for each sub-key value using the training set 
in random sequence.  
Arranging the training set in ascending order results a better response as 
shown in figures 5.5 and 5.6. This is another analogy between neural 
network and interpolation where an ordered set of data points eases the 
calculations in interpolation. Also it was noted from experiments that the 
correct key value mapping is learned much faster by the neural network 
than the other wrong values as a consistent mapping is at hand.   
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Figure 5.5: RESULTS FOR 2 ROUNDS, KEY VALUE = 105. 
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Figure 5.6: RESULTS FOR 2 ROUNDS, KEY VALUE = 112. 
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The attack on 3 and 4 rounds variants was not successful using the above 
neural structure, a more complicated structure using 2 hidden layers was 
successful. The reason is that using more rounds, complicates the 
mapping and reduces the common features a neural network to find a 
universal approximation to the mapping. Also more examples were 
needed to perform a correct mapping, from equation 5.5, about 53 
examples were needed for 4 rounds. 
The number of training examples is a little bit low with the neural attack 
than other attacks, but the absolute value should not be tricky as we are 
using here a very small variant with only 16 bit block size and only 8 bit 
round key for proving the concept. Figure 5.7 and figure 5.8 show the 
result for 3 and 4 rounds cipher respectively. 
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Figure 5.7: RESULTS FOR 3 ROUNDS, KEY VALUE = 194. 
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Figure 5.8: RESULTS FOR 4 ROUNDS, KEY VALUE = 117. 
The attack is believed to be extendable to further rounds, but due to the 
limited computational power of a single PC, the capability of applying the 
attack for larger ciphers is limited. For example, the 2 hidden layer neural 
used for the last experiment needed about 15 hours to complete testing all 
the possible key value for the 4 rounds variant using a P IV 2.8 GHz with 
hyper threading technology micro processor. But due to the inherited 
parallel nature of neural networks, the attack is promising to be modified 
to a distributed version for larger ciphers and real ciphers. 
5.4 Comparison 
The proposed attack use a similar concept to the interpolation attack as 
both of them are using a way to approximate the R-1 rounds cipher and 
then try to find the correct last round key value.  
The proposed attack has the benefit of being parallel by nature and can be 
easily extended to a distributed version. Also there are no equations to be 
solved or evaluated like the case of using Lagrange or Newton 
interpolation.  
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Chapter 6: Neural Network Based Block Cipher 
eural networks have many interesting characteristics like 
parallelism, non linearity, and flexibility of their function 
mapping with high degree of freedom due to large number of 
weights. The above mentioned three properties of neural networks, are 
attractive to block cipher designers to be used as a confusion producing 
element. In this chapter, an approach of using neural networks as building 
block in a block cipher is proposed. The new cipher is called I-CRYPT. 
The proposed block cipher is based on the Feistel network structure with 
a neural network as the cipher core function. The core function in many 
block ciphers is implemented using S-Boxes that perform some sort of 
non-linear mapping between its input and its output domains. So the 
design parameters characterizing S-Boxes, and generally cipher core 
functions, are detailed in the next sections. Each design parameter is 
studied and its effect on the overall cipher security and performance is 
detailed. Different design methodologies are also presented and finally a 
proposal of a novel block cipher is given and studied. 
6.1 Neural Networks for Domain Mapping  
One application of neural networks is to be used as a domain mapping for 
complex functions. Neural networks can learn this mapping using several 
pairs of input - output from the mapping without knowing the original 
function. 
In the approach of designing I-CRYPT, a neural network is used as 32 x 
32 S-Box which is believed to be secured due to its large size. The 
approach of designing the S-Box neural network is to use a Random 
initialization with a key dependent mapping similar to the approach used 
in the Blowfish cipher, see chapter 2 for details.  
N 
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6.2 Feistel Cipher Design parameters 
Many design parameters characterize the Feistel block cipher. Modern 
block ciphers differ from each other in those parameters and basically 
they use the same model or some variations of it. In this section those 
parameters and their effect on the overall cipher are described. 
6.2.1 Block Size 
Larger block size means greater security keeping all other parameters 
fixed. This is because the statistical information of bigger chunks of the 
plaintext are confused using the core Function.  
But the bigger the block size the slower the encryption or decryption 
processes. A block size of 64 bits is an accepted size for most block 
ciphers and recently a 128 bit is the preferred size. 
6.2.2 Key Size and key scheduling 
Key length is also a major component in measuring the security. In the 
case of lack of any other attack than brute force, key length is the only 
measure of security. Larger keys may also result in degraded 
encryption/decryption performance. A key of at least 128 bit is now 
believed to be secure enough at least against exhaustive search attacks. 
Key scheduling is the process of generating the round sub-keys from the 
original key. The most secured algorithm is to use statistically 
independent sub-keys for each round, but this means a very large key. 
Most modern block ciphers use a key scheduling algorithm based on 
some criteria and many considerably secured ciphers use the 
cryptographic core itself in generating the sub-keys. Greater complexity 
in key scheduling usually means more security and the price of longer 
setup time. There are a lot of studies and works on attacking the key 
scheduling algorithm itself and hence degrading the security of the overall 
cipher. 
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6.2.3 Number of rounds 
The basic criterion of Feistel cipher is to apply the product cipher more 
than one time to produce greater security. More rounds mean more 
security. From another point of view more rounds means higher order 
cipher. The order of the ciphers is an expression found in some attack 
literature namely interpolation attacks [32] and similar ones. In these 
attacks, the cipher is approximated into an algebraic function, 
polynomials in many cases. The higher the order of the cipher the more 
secure cipher against those attacks since higher order algebraic functions 
are harder to be solved and need more points to evaluate. The idea of 
product cipher means that if a round of the cipher is of degree n, then an r 
round cipher is of r x n degree which results in a harder cipher to be 
attacked. 
6.2.4 Round Function F 
The round function is the main component of the block cipher of Feistel 
type. It is usually called the core function. The basic purpose of F is to 
produce confusion and it is the main component indicating the algebraic 
degree of the cipher as described in the previous section. In general F 
must be as complex as possible to make cryptanalysis harder.  
In the Rijndael proposal to NIST for a new block cipher to replace DES, a 
great work in mathematics especially the works of Nyberg [31] made 
some guidelines for the choice of the core S-Box. But the S-box chosen is 
still a small one. Schneier [28] in his blowfish cipher used a key 
dependent S-Box. The S-boxes used are generated based on the key and 
has a large setup time. The S-boxes are 8 x 32, still with small input size 
but large output size. 
S-boxes are usually implemented by lookup tables and input size of 8 bits 
is most preferred as the lookup table can be implemented using small 
memories with 256 words size.  
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In this thesis, a neural network based round function is proposed which is 
a generalization of S-Boxes with larger inputs and outputs. The core 
neural network is key dependant but with a small setup time. 
6.2.5 Design Criteria for F [2] 
6.2.5.1 Avalanche effect 
Avalanche linguistically means a huge unexpected action happening due 
to a small cause. In block cipher design the avalanche effect is a measure 
of how many bits are changed in the cipher-text if one bit of the plaintext 
or the key is changed. It is clear that more avalanche ratio means more 
security. One design criterion of DES S boxes was to introduce about 
50% avalanche effect. A close look to each DES S-box, one can see that if 
a single bit of the input is changed, two bits of four output bits are 
changed.  
6.2.5.2 Strict Avalanche Criterion 
This is a more rigid definition of the avalanche effect. It was suggested by 
Webster [2] that any output bit j of an S-box should change with 
probability 1/2 if any single input bit i is inverted for all i, and j. A similar 
criterion can be easily adapted for any core function not using S-box 
scheme. 
6.2.5.3 Bit Independence Criterion 
Also Webster [2] suggested that output bits j and k should change 
independently when a single input bit i is inverted for all i, j, and k. 
 
6.2.5.4 Guaranteed Avalanche 
Heys proposed another criterion [2] that is guaranteed avalanche. The 
criterion is as follows, An S-box satisfies the Guaranteed Avalanche of 
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order  if for one input bit change, at least   output bits are changed. A 
conclusion of   being between 2 and 5 produces strong confusion. 
6.2.5.5 Input-Output size of F 
A function F is n x m if it has n input bits and m output bits. In DES a 6 x 
4 S-box is used. Blowfish has 8 x 32 size. Schneier [27] states that Larger 
S-boxes are more resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis. But as 
mentioned before, the most preferred and easiest way of realizing F is by 
using S-boxes implemented as lookup table, this enforces small input size 
at least. In this thesis neural network as a realization of the core function 
F is proposed which overcomes the size limitation of the lookup table 
method. 
6.2.5.6 Design methodologies of F 
The core function F is basically a mapping between two binary domains 
with sizes of m x n. As mentioned earlier S-boxes are the most widely 
used realization technique. As Robshaw quoted in [43], there are four 
approaches to design an S-box 
 Random: using some pseudo random number generator to 
generate the s-box lookup table. This approach may result in an 
undesired properties for small s-boxes but it should be acceptable 
for larger ones. 
 Random with testing: where the previous approach is used to 
construct an initial mapping, then by using the measuring criteria 
like those mentioned before, the design may be kept or thrown 
away. 
 Human-made: where manual techniques with simple 
mathematics are used to construct the mapping. This was the 
approach used in the DES design and it is very difficult to be used 
for large S-boxes design. 
 Math-made: where a solid mathematical foundations are used to 
produce a mapping with a predetermined characteristics. This 
approach was used in designing the S-box of Rijndael.  
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Random and key dependent: this approach is used by Schneier in the 
design of Blowfish [28]. The s-boxes are generated randomly then the key 
is used to tune them. This approach is not stated in [43] but it is widely 
accepted.  
The last approach can be used to develop some how large S-boxes and the 
key dependence hardens the analysis of the entire cipher. In the case of 
differential cryptanalysis, the number of core function mapping to be 
analyzed are very large and it is very hard or approximately impossible to 
build a key recovery attack in this case as the structure itself varies with 
the key.  
Another example where the core function is composed of smaller fixed 
components but with different possible structures is the Tornado cipher 
proposed by Abo Elfotouh in [44]. In that work a key dependent structure 
of the cipher is proposed and seems immune to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. 
6.3 The I-CRYPT 64 Block Cipher 
The I-CRYPT block cipher is basically a Feistel cipher with a neural 
network as its core function. The basic cipher is a 64 bit block cipher with 
the ability to be extended to other sizes. The key size is 64 bits and the 
number of rounds must be even. A sub-key is generated for each round 
using a carefully chosen key scheduling algorithm. 
The main benefits of the I-CRYPT over other block ciphers especially 
blowfish is its larger core function and its fast setup time compared to 
blowfish. The cipher can be used in applications where the key can be 
rapidly changed. 
6.3.1 I-CRYPT 64 Core Function F 
The core function of the I-CRYPT cipher is a neural network. The design 
of the network is as follows. 
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Number of layers: 1 layer 
Number of neurons: 32 neurons 
Neurons activation function: Hard Limiter 
Network topology: Fully connected 
Input layer size: 32 
Each neuron has an extra bias input b. This structure performs a 32 x 32 
bit mapping depending on the values of the weights and the inputs to the 
bias links.  
In the I-CRYPT weights are chosen randomly at design time and round 
sub-key is applied as inputs to the bias links, see figure 6.2 (a). The value 
b is also chosen randomly at design time. The output of the neural 
network is hence key dependent. 
The neuron activation function is highly non linear and is very hard to be 
approximated to a linear function. The overall structure can be 
implemented using only a 32*32+1 memory to hold all the weights and 
bias values resulting in approximately 1 k word memory. The weights are 
restricted to discrete values and a range form -128 to 127 is a good one. 
The overall memory required is 1025 bytes. In the case of a lookup S-Box 
a memory of 232 words each 32 bits is needed or 16 Giga bytes.  
The core neural network introduces a great confusion and diffusion 
effects. Each output bit is a function of all input bits and all the key bits. 
Permutation is inherited in the full connection scheme used in the 
construction of the neural network. Avalanche effect is also very high due 
to the structure of the cipher. 
An interesting feature that requires a lot of future work is the ability to 
adapt the weights of the neural network to perform a certain mapping. 
This point involves a lot of work in selecting the learning algorithm, the 
quality measuring factors and so on. It is suggested that discrete weights 
and some sort of reinforcement learning with Hebbian learning method 
can be used. 
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6.3.2 I-CRYPT 64 Cipher Structure 
The I-CRYPT cipher is a Feistel cipher. This choice was made due to that 
neural network as described earlier is not reversible by itself. It can not be 
verified that it is reversible until a complete mapping is performed and a 
one to one feature is shown. Generally this is not possible and is not 
needed as a Feistel cipher is reversible independently of the reversibility 
of the core function.  
Figure 6.1 shows one round of the I-CRYPT cipher. 
 
Figure 6.1: I-CRYPT ROUND 
As can be seen from the figure the I-CRYPT round is a normal Feistel 
round where the key is mixed with the right half using bitwise XOR and 
is also used as an input to the core neural network. The neural network is 
then key dependent and for a single bit change, a change in the output 
occurs. 
Another way of introducing the key is to use a 64 input neural network 
with the key applied as inputs to the neural network. Figure 6.2 (a) shows 
the first possibility where Figure 6.2 (b) shows the other one. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 6.2: POSSIBILITIES OF APPLYING THE KEY BITS IN THE I-CRYPT 
The difference between the two options is in the way the output is 
affected by the key. Both neural networks are key dependent, but the later 
one have a greater avalanche effect for key change than the first one and 
hence it is better, but the number of weights is doubled and also the 
memory required. 
 
6.3.3 Input Output Interpretation. 
Input bits and key bits are presented to the network in there binary form 
but 0 bits are interpreted as -1 instead of just zeros. This is better because 
the zero value does not participate in the output of the network, it just 
124 
leaves the decision to other one bits, while negative values tries to inhibit 
the output of each neuron it is connected to.  
It is a mater of interpretation and some math justification will do the job 
quit good. 
6.3.4 I-CRYPT 64 Number of Rounds 
The proposed cipher Number of rounds is dependent on some design 
choices like performance, key scheduling algorithm, and of course 
security. In this version of the cipher, a 64 bit key is used. Each round 
needs only 32 bits. Simply the design requires an even number of rounds, 
each pair of rounds share a 64 bit round key half by half.  
For the performance and security reasons, 10 rounds is believed to be 
secure and efficient in performance after several experimentation. 
6.3.5 I-CRYPT 64 Key Scheduling 
The I-CRYPT cipher uses its cryptographic core in key scheduling. The 
key scheduling algorithm is then as secure as the cipher itself. Schneier 
suggested using this technique in his proposal for TOWFISH cipher. The 
key schedule is very simple and is as follows. 
1. Divide the user supplied 64 bit key into two halves. 
2. Pass each half as an input to the neural network using the other 
half as the key. 
3. XOR each of the output 32 bit block with the input block. 
4. If an all-zero half appears, encrypt it using a two round I-CRYPT 
with the user supplied key as the two rounds key. 
5. Replace the key used in 1 with the resulting key and repeat again 
until all rounds sub-keys are obtained. 
6.3.6 Other I-CRYPT Variants 
The I-CRYPT is very flexible and can be used with any block size. 
Variants of 128, 192, and 256 bits have been implemented and tested. The 
64 bit version described earlier is solely intended for cryptanalysis 
purpose and for the cryptography community as a proof of concept. 
125 
6.3.7 Cryptanalysis of I-CRYPT 
It is believed that most cryptanalysis of I-CRYPT is very difficult due to 
its key dependent core function. The large size of the function which 
performs 32 bit to 32 bit mapping with high nonlinearity in the hard 
limiter activation function and huge avalanche due to the structure of the 
network are all element that increase the security of the cipher to a high 
extent. Differential and Linear cryptanalysis are believed not to be 
possible on the 10 rounds cipher. 
Further investigations are required on the class of neural based block 
ciphers. 
6.3.8 Performance of the I-CRYPT 
Neural networks are parallel by nature and hence a parallel architecture is 
the best to implement the I-CRYPT cipher, but on normal processors it is 
still efficient to implement neural networks in software.  
The most time consuming calculation is the calculation of activation of 
each neuron involving multiplying the input to the weights and summing 
all of them. 
In a very simplified version of I-CRYPT weights are restricted to -1 and 1 
and hence all the multiplication process can be simplified to an XNOR 
and summation can be implemented using a byte lookup table where each 
byte is looked up in a 256 entry table that contains in each row the sum of 
all the bits where zeros are considered -1 as described earlier, see figure 
6.3 and figure 6.4 for description. This version of I-CRYPT still has all its 
security and strength with the merit of extreme performance on normal 
PCs. 
X Y  X' Y' X'Y'  XY 
0 0 0 as -1 -1 -1 1 -1 as 0 1 
0 1 → -1 1 -1 → 0 
1 0  1 -1 -1  0 
1 1  1 1 1  1 
Figure 6.3: MULTIPLICATION PERFORMED AS AN XNOR 
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Number Summation of bits (0 as -1) 
0 -8 
1 -7 
2 -7 
3 -6 
4 -7 
.  
.  
255 8 
Figure 6.4: SUMMATION OF BITS OF 8 BITS BYTES WHEN 0 BITS 
INTERPRETED AS -1 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
his thesis was concerned with the use of intelligent systems such 
as genetic algorithms and neural networks in information security 
cryptography mechanism. Three proposals were given in this 
research work and they were evaluated. Those proposals are 
1. A proposed extension to the differential attack using cryptanalysis 
which resulted in a general extension that can be applied to any 
cipher vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis and at one quarter of 
the complexity of the original attack. 
2. A proposed extension to the interpolation attack using back 
propagation neural networks which outperforms the original attack 
in that id does not need to solve or evaluate a huge number of 
equations and yet the novel proposal can attack more complicated 
ciphers than the interpolation cryptanalysis can attack 
3. A novel block cipher based on a neural network as its core 
function is proposed. The proposed core function can be much 
larger than the S-boxes for their input output sizes, and hence 
more secure than smaller realizations, and yet outperforms the S-
box lookup process and requires much lower memory for the same 
size. 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
The following points summarize the concluding remarks 
1. Cryptography and especially block ciphers importance in 
information security was cleared out. 
2. It was shown how statistical techniques are limited in 
cryptanalysis for modern block ciphers. 
3. Differential attacks was also described and detailed on the basic 
Substitution Permutation Network. 
4. Also Interpolation attacks were introduced. 
T 
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5. Genetic algorithms are shown to improve the performance of 
differential attacks and it was tested on the basic two models of 
most modern block ciphers, the Substitution Permutation Network 
and the Feistel network. 
6. Proposed Neural networks cryptanalysis is shown to work with 
ciphers non vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis. 
7. Finally a neural network block cipher is proposed and we claim it 
is very secure due to its large size and highly non linear core 
function realized by the neural network. 
7.2 Future Work 
Many points still open for future work, for examples: 
1. Using parallel competing genetic algorithms on both the key space 
and chosen plaintext space to further optimization of differential 
attack 
2. Using the genetic algorithm and neural network in a cooperative 
attack on complicated ciphers 
3. Applying and extending the proposed attack to more ciphers. 
4. Increasing the performance of the proposed I-CRYPT cipher. 
5. Studying the point of applying reinforcement learning to tune the 
weights of the I-CRYPT core neural network to achieve one or 
more of the design criteria of core functions.  
6. Studying other neural network models, especially the Hopfield 
optimization network, for cryptanalysis 
7. Studying hardware software co design for implementing the 
proposed I-CRYPT cipher. 
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Appendix (A): Artificial Intelligence 
A.1 Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic algorithms are considered as one of the most efficient search 
techniques. Although they do not offer an optimal solution, their ability to 
reach a suitable solution in considerably short time gives them their 
respectable role in many artificial intelligence and searching techniques. 
The following sections introduce genetic algorithms and describe their 
characteristics. 
A.1.1 Genetic algorithms 
In this section a brief description of genetic algorithm and its 
characteristics is introduced [45]. Holland (1969, 1975) proposed the use 
of genetic algorithm as an efficient search mechanism in artificially 
adaptive systems. This procedure was designed to incorporate specific 
operators, emphasizing especially crossover and inversion.  
The easiest way to consider a GA is in the context of a function 
optimization problem. The goal is to search through a space of function 
inputs (represented by some binary string) to find the input which 
maximizes a given target function. A genetic algorithm begins with a 
randomly selected population of function inputs represented by strings. 
The GA uses the current population of strings to create a new population 
such that the strings in the new population are on average "better" than 
those in the current population.  
Three processes which have a parallel in human genetics are used to make 
the transition from one population generation to the next. They are 
selection, crossover, and mutation. The basic GA cycle based on these 
three processes is shown in Figure A.1.  
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FIGURE A.1 THE BASIC GENETIC ALGORITHM CYCLE. 
The genetic algorithm has proven to be very effective in some search 
problems [45]. While it may seem to be a random search, in fact, the 
improvement in each generation indicates that the algorithm provides an 
effective directed search technique.  
A.1.1.1 Implementation of GA 
Genetic algorithms are typically implemented as follows, 
The problem to be addressed is defined and captured in an objective 
function that indicates the fitness of any potential solution. 
A population of candidate solutions is initialized subject to certain 
constraints. Typically, each trial is coded as a vector x, termed a 
chromosome, with elements being described as genes and varying values 
at specific positions called alleles. All solutions should be represented by 
binary strings. For example, if it is desired to find the scalar value x that 
maximizes 
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F(x) = -x2, 
Then a finite range of values for x would be selected and the minimum 
possible value in the range would be represented by the string [0... 0], 
with the maximum value being represented by the string [1... 1]. The 
desired degree of precision would indicate the appropriate length of the 
binary coding. 
Each chromosome, Xi, i = 1,….,P, in the population is decoded into a 
form appropriate for evaluation and a fitness score is assigned to each 
chromosome, 
)( ix , according to the objective. 
a probability of reproduction, pi, i = 1,..,P, is assigned to each 
chromosome, so that its likelihood of being selected is proportional to its 
fitness relative to the other chromosomes in the population. If the fitness 
of each chromosome is a strictly positive number to be maximized, this is 
traditionally accomplished using roulette wheel selection, Figure A.2. 
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% 
total 
Function String Number 
14.4 
49.2 
5.5 
30.9 
169 
576 
64 
361 
011110110111 
011010010111 
101101111011 
111010010111 
1 
2 
3 
4 
100 1170  Total 
    
 
FIGURE A.2 ROULETTE WHEEL SELECTION MECHANISM 
According to the assigned probabilities of reproduction, p, i= I, P, a new 
population of chromosomes is generated by probabilistically selecting 
strings from the current population. The selected chromosomes generate 
offspring via the use of specific genetic operators, such as crossover and 
bit mutation. Crossover is applied to two chromosomes (parents) and 
creates two new chromosomes (offspring). This is done by selecting a 
random position along the coding and by exchanging the section that 
appears before the selected position in the first string with the section that 
appears after the selected position in the second string, and vice versa. 
Figure A.3 shows this process. Bit mutation simply offers the chance to 
flip some bits in the coding of a new solution, see figure A.4.  
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     Crossover Point  
Parent #1: 1101 0111101 Offspring #1: 10100111101 
Parent #2: 1010 0000100 Offspring #2: 11010000100 
 
FIGURE A.3 THE ONE-POINT CROSSOVER OPERATOR APPLIED TO TWO 
PARENTS. 
 
Old String 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
New String 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
FIGURE A.4 MUTATION PROCESS. 
 
Typical values for the probabilities of crossover and bit mutation range 
from 0.25 to 0.95 and 0.001 to 0.01, respectively. 
The process is halted if a suitable solution is found or if the available 
computing time is expired. Otherwise, the process goes to step 3, where 
the new chromosomes are scored and the procedure iterates. 
For example, suppose the task is to find a vector of 100 bits {0, 1} such 
that the sum of all the bits in the vector is maximized. The objective 
function could be written as  



100
1
,)(
i
ixx
 
Where x is a vector of 100 symbols from {0, 1}. Such vector x could be 
scored with respect to (x) and would receive fitness ranging from zero to 
100. Let an initial population of 100 parents be selected completely at 
random and subjected to roulette wheel selection in light of (x), (fitness 
function) with the probabilities of crossover and bit mutation being 0.8 
and 0.01, respectively. The process will rapidly converge to a vector of all 
l's. A number of issues must be addressed when using a genetic algorithm 
[45].  
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 Using of binary representation versus floating point representation 
especially in real values optimization.   
 Selection in proportion to fitness can be problematic. Since (1) 
Roulette wheel selection depends on positive values, and (2) 
simply adding a large constant value to the objective function can 
eliminate selection. Other problems of fairness may arise for this 
selection technique.  
 Premature convergence is another important concern in genetic 
algorithms. This occurs when the population of chromosomes 
reaches a configuration such that crossover no longer produces 
offspring that can outperform their parents, as must be the case in 
a homogeneous population. Under such circumstances, all 
standard forms of crossover simply regenerate the current parents. 
Any further optimization relies solely on bit mutation and can be 
quite slow.  
Although many open questions remain, genetic algorithms have been 
used to address diverse practical optimization problems successfully.  
A.1.2 Example of applying GA to function optimization. 
In this section, the results from the GA simulator, which has been 
developed as a part of the thesis supplementary work, are introduced. A 
complex function of two variables is used to test the process. Consider the 
following function, 
)20sin(.)4sin(.5.21),( 221121 xxxxxxf     
and the ranges for x1,x2 are –3<x1<12.1 and 4.1<x2<5.8, 
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FIGURE A.5 A GRAPH OF A FUNCTION TO BE MAXIMIZED 
Figure A.5 shows a graphical representation of the given function 
Let us consider finding the values of x1 and x2 such that the function is 
maximized. Assume that the required precision is four decimal places for 
each variable. That means the range of x1 should be divided into 151000 
equal size ranges and also for x2 17000 slides are required. Resulting in 
2567 * 106 possible values for the combination of the two variables. If we 
try to find the values for x1 and x2 giving maximum value of the function 
f, we find the maximum value of f equals 38.9354 for x1=12.0999 and 
x2= 5.7227 
This result was found after 01 hours, 04 minutes, and 59 seconds using a 
Pentium 233 PC and a simple C++ program written for this purpose. The 
code of the program is as follows, 
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for (float x1=-3.0;x1<=12.1;x1+=0.0001) 
 for (float x2=4.1;x2<=5.8;x2+=0.0001) 
 { 
 fit=21.5+x1*sin(88.0/7.0*x1)+x2*sin(440.0/7.0*x2); 
      if(fit>maxfit) 
   { 
maxfit=fit; 
bestx1=x1; 
bestx2=x2; 
   } 
 } 
Now let us try to find a solution for the same problem using GA. First the 
solutions to be found must be decoded into binary strings that represent 
the different values for x1 and x2. For x1 we need 18 bits and for x2 we 
need 15 bits resulting a total of 33 bits which is going to be the length of 
our chromosome. The decoding formulas for x1 and x2 are as follows, 
12
)0.3(1.12
*])18:1[(0.3
181 

 chromodecimalX
 
12
)1.4(8.5
*])33:19[(1.4
152 

 chromodecimalX
 
Now let us assume the following parameters for our GA problem 
Population size:    50 chromosome 
Chromosome size:    33 bits 
Maximum number of generations:  200 generations 
Crossover probability:    0.25 
Mutation probability:     0.1 
Running the simulator gives the following results, 
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Maximum value obtained was 37.5385 for generation no. 160 at values 
x1=10.6324 and x2=5.51564. The time consumed for the 200 generations 
was 2.884 sec 
 
FIGURE A.6 CHANGE OF FITNESS VS. GENERATION 
Figure A.6 shows the fitness value variation for each generation. The best 
chromosome is the only one plotted. 
Figure A.7 focuses on the changes around the optimal value found  
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FIGURE A.7 VARIATION OF THE BEST FITNESS VALUE. 
As seen from the figure, GA actually oscillates around the best value. The 
algorithm in its basic description does not hold the best value from a 
generation to another, and so the best value may be conserved in any 
generation during the process.  
A.2 Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) [46]-[50] are highly parallel 
interconnections of simple processing elements or neurons that function 
as a collective system. There exist various problems in pattern recognition 
that humans seem more efficient in solving as compared to computers. 
Neural networks may be seen as an attempt to emulate such human 
performance. These networks can be broadly categorized as those that 
learn adaptively by updating their connection weights during training and 
whose parameters are time-invariant [51]. 
In the following Section, we will give a general idea about ANNs.  
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A.2.1 Neural Networks Approaches 
Artificial neural networks are physical cellular systems that can acquire, 
store, and utilize experimental knowledge [52]. An artificial neural 
network is a structure that tries to mimic the human brain. There are 
different types of networks; each is designed to solve a specific problem. 
In this chapter Back Propagation Networks (BPN) are reviewed in details. 
A.2.2 Processing Elements 
Neurons perform as summing and nonlinear mapping junctions. In some 
cases they can be considered as threshold limits that fire when their total 
input exceeds certain bias level. Neurons usually operate in parallel and 
are configured in regular architectures. They are often organized in layers, 
and feedback connections both within the layer and toward adjacent 
layers are allowed. Each connection’s strength is expressed by a 
numerical value called a weigh, which can be modified [52]. 
 
FIGURE A.8 PROCESSING NODE AND SYNAPTIC CONNECTIONS. 
 
Every neuron model consists of a processing element (PE) with synaptic 
input connections and a single output. The signal flow of neuron inputs is 
considered to be unidirectional as from input to output indicated by 
arrows. Figure A.8 shows a general neuron symbol. This symbolic 
representation shows a set of weights and the neuron's processing unit. 
The neuron output signal is given by the following relationship: 
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)(vfo 
 (A.1) 
The variable net is defined as: 

j
jjiw v
 (A.2) 
The function f(v) is often referred as an activation function. 
Observe from Equation (A.1) that the neuron as a processing node 
performs the operation of summation of its weighted inputs, or the scalar 
product of both the input and weight vectors to obtain net. Subsequently, 
it performs the nonlinear operation f(v) through its activation function. 
Typical activation functions used are: 
ve
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 (A.3) 
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 (A.4) 
Where λ is proportional to the neuron gain determining the steepness of 
the continuous function f(net) near v = 0. The continuous activation 
function is shown in Figure A.9 for λ=1 
The soft-limiting activation function (A.3) is often called sigmoidal 
characteristics, as opposed to the hard-limiting activation function given 
in (A.4). The hard-limiting activation function describes the discrete 
neuron model. 
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Essentially, any function f(v) that is monotonically increasing and 
continuous such that f(v) (0,1) can be used instead of (A.3) as an 
activation function. 
 
 
FIGURE A.9 UNI-POLAR ACTIVATION FUNCTION OF A NEURON. 
A.2.3 Network Topology 
There are several network topologies. Each topology is designed to solve 
a specific problem or to represent certain point of view. Each topology 
has some drawbacks and benefits. These topologies can be categorized in 
three main categories: Fully interconnected, feed forward connection, and 
mixed connectivity. 
In Feed forward connection, the neurons are organized in multiple layers, 
so that a neuron in a certain layer is connected only to neurons on the next 
layer as shown in Figure A.10. Multilayer perceptrons [53] belong to this 
category. 
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FIGURE A.10 A THREE-LAYER FULLY INTERCONNECTED NETWORK. 
A.2.4 Learning Algorithm 
The learning algorithm in neural networks is the process of adjusting the 
weights of neurons (PEs), so the network can perform a specific task. The 
learning process is divided into two categories: Supervised learning and 
unsupervised learning. In supervised learning, the network is given both 
the input and the output, and it tries to adjust its weight in a way to 
minimize the error between its normal output and the desired output. In 
unsupervised learning, which is more difficult to implement, the network 
is only exposed to different inputs and it tries to extract the similarities 
between them. 
There are different learning algorithms developed for neural networks. 
Those algorithms have been developed to be suitable to certain network 
topologies and to overcome the drawbacks of other algorithms. Most 
algorithms are based on the hill-climbing optimization or steepest descent 
concept, but as the problems tend to be more complexes, new concepts of 
learning were proposed. Many new algorithms are based on using Genetic 
Algorithm, Simulated Annealing and Random optimization [54]-[57]. 
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A.2.6 Back Propagation Network 
Back-propagation [48] is the most widely algorithm used for 
classification. The back propagation network (BPN) [48], [42] is a 
layered, feed forward network that is fully interconnected by layers. Thus, 
there are no feedback connections and no connections that bypass one 
layer to go directly to a later layer. It employs the supervised mode of 
learning. 
A.2.6.1 BPN Operation 
The network learns a predefined set of input-output example pairs by 
using a two-phase propagate-adapt cycle. After an input pattern has been 
applied as a stimulus to the first layer of network units, it is propagated 
through each upper layer until an output is generated. This output is then 
compared to the desired output, and an error signal is computed for each 
output unit. The error signals are then transmitted backward from the 
output layer to each node in the intermediate layer contributing directly to 
the output. However, each unit in the intermediate layer receives only a 
portion of the total error signal, based roughly on the relative contribution 
of the unit made to the original output. This process repeats layer by 
layer, until each node in the network has received an error signal that 
describes its relative contribution to the total error. Based on the error 
signal received, connection weights are then updated by each unit to cause 
the network to converge toward a state that allows all the training patterns 
to be encoded. 
The significance of this process is that, as the network trains, the nodes in 
the intermediate layers organize themselves such that different nodes 
learn to recognize different features of the total input space. After 
training, when presented with an arbitrary input pattern that is noisy or 
incomplete, the units in the hidden layers of the network will respond 
with an active output if the new input contains a pattern that resembles the 
feature, the individual units learned, to recognize during training. 
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Conversely, hidden-layer units have a tendency to inhibit their outputs if 
the input pattern does not contain the feature that they were trained to 
recognize. 
As the signals propagate through the different layers in the network, the 
activity pattern presented at each upper layer can be thought of as a 
pattern with features that can be recognized by units in the subsequent 
layer. The output pattern generated can be thought of as a feature map that 
provides an indication of the presence or absence of many different 
feature combinations at the input. The total effect of this behaviour is that 
the BPN provides an effective means of allowing a computer system to 
examine data patterns that may be incomplete or noisy, and to recognize 
subtle patterns from the partial input [42]. 
A.2.6.2 The BPN Algorithm 
For the described network, the back propagation algorithm is 
summarized. For details refer to [42], [57]. Figure A.11 shows the multi-
layer BPN architecture. 
 
 
FIGURE A.11 3 LAYERS BACK-PROPAGATION NETWORK 
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Step 1 Apply the input vector xp= (xp1,xp2,…..,xpn) to the input units. 
Step 2: Calculate the net input values to the hidden layer units: 
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Step 3: Calculate the output from the hidden layer 
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Step 4: Move to the output layer, calculate the net-input values to each 
unit 
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Note that the error terms on the hidden units are calculated before the 
connection weights to the output-layer units have been updated. 
Step 8: Update weights on the output layer: 
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Step 9: Update weights of the hidden layer: 
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The order of the weight updates on an individual layer is not important. 
Be sure to calculate the error term 
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Since this quantity is the measure of how well the network is learning 
when the error is acceptably small for each of the training vector pairs 
training can be discontinued. 
 
Back Propagation Neural Network Training Summary. 
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Where: 
xp is the Input vector, 
 
h
pjnet  is the net input to the jth hidden unit, 
h
jiw  is the weight on the connection from the ith input unit, 
h
j is the bias term, 
The "h" superscript refers to quantities on the hidden layer. 
pji
 is the output of this node is, 
o
kpj
o
kj
o
pj ,iw,net   and    pk
o
have the same meaning but for the output 
layer, 
where the "o" superscript refers to quantities on the output layer, 
)( pkpkpk oye   is the error at a single output unit, 
where subscript “p” refers to the pth training vector.  
and ”k” refers to the kth output unit. 
ypk is the desired output value,  
and opk is the actual output from the k
th unit, 
The factor   is called the learning-rate parameter, 0 <   < 1. 
A2.6.3 Practical Considerations 
The back propagation algorithm is now widely recognized as a powerful 
tool for learning input-output mappings, with many applications in such 
areas as pattern recognition, time series forecasting, and control. 
However, all users of BPN have been confronted to two main drawbacks: 
1. The slowness of the learning process, especially when large 
training sets, or large networks have to be used, and 
2. The absence, so far, of any theoretical result, or heuristics, 
allowing for a reliable apriori determination of an optimal network 
architecture for a given task. 
For the first point, the training may take long time and convergence 
behaviour may depend on: 
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1. The learning rate[59]. 
2. The number of hidden units [60] – [62]. 
3. The number of layers. 
4. The nature of the training patterns. 
5. Weights initialization [62] – [64]. 
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Appendix (B): Mathematical Background 
B.1 Interpolation 
It happens occasionally that we need to estimate intermediate values 
between precise data points. The most common method used for this 
purpose is polynomial interpolation. The general form of nth-order 
polynomial is 
n
nn xaxaxaaxP  ......)(
2
210  (B.1) 
For n+1 data points there is one and only one polynomial of order n 
passing through these points. For example there is only one straight line 
passing through 2 points and only one parabola passing thought 3 points 
and so on, see figure b.1 
 
 
FIGURE B.1: POSSIBLE POLYNOMIAL PASSING THROUGH 2, 3, AND 4 POINTS 
Polynomial interpolation consists of finding the unique nth-order 
polynomial that fits the n+1 points. This polynomial provides a formula to 
find the intermediate points. The need for n+1 points comes from the fact 
that an nth-order polynomial has n+1 unknowns, these are the coefficients 
of the successive power of x, a0 through an and so n+1 equations are 
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needed and these equations can be found from the substitution of the n+1 
data points. 
b.1.1 Lagrange Interpolation 
The Lagrange interpolating polynomials are very straight forward to 
calculate. The method is characterized by the equations 
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or if we combined them it becomes  
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For example the linear version (n=1) is 
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and the second order version is  
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Notice that for equation b.6 each term is a second order curve that passes 
at specific point of the 3 points and is 0 at the 2 others, see figure b.2, and 
hence the summation of the 3 curves is the only second order curve 
passing through the 3 points 
 
FIGURE B.2: CONSTRUCTION OF A SECOND ORDER CURVE USING 3 POINTS 
 
 
b.1.2 Newton Interpolation 
A practically convenient for of the interpolating polynomial for n+1 data 
points, that is an nth order polynomial, is  
)).....()((.....))(()()( 110102010  nnn xxxxxxbxxxxbxxbbxf
  (B.7) 
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The above equation is equivalent equation b.1. n+1 data points are needed 
to calculate the coefficients b0,b1,…..,bn.  We use the following equations 
to evaluate the coefficients. 
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Where the bracket function evaluation is called the divided difference. 
For example the first divided difference is  
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and the second is 
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and similarly 
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using these equations, yields the Newton divided difference interpolating 
polynomial that is 
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 The equation b.12 seems a little bit complicated, but this complication 
can be reduced if a table is used to evaluate the differences. 
b.1.3 Evaluating Newton Equation using Horner’s Method 
The Newton interpolation form was written as  
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Now let us consider rearranging the equation in the following form 
Let 
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Found on the ladder described earlier. Then the Newton equation can be 
written as  
))....()()((
......))(()()(
1210
102010


nn xxxxxxxxa
xxxxaxxaaxf
 (B.14) 
which can be written as  
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Then the equation can be written as 
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Which is easier in calculation. 
B.2 Finite Fields 
Finite fields have become very important in cryptography. In the scope of 
this thesis, Rijndael cipher was illustrated and in this cipher, the core 
function design is based on properties of finite fields. In this section a 
brief introduction to finite fields is given. It is referred to [2], [65], and 
[66] for details. 
B.2.1 Groups, Rings, and Fields 
Before defining fields, groups and rings must be first defined. 
A group is a set of element and a mathematical operation usually called 
addition, and + is used as a symbol, with the following properties. 
A 1. Closure under addition 
A 2. Associativity of addition 
A 3. Existence of additive identity 
A 4. Existence of additive inverse 
Consider that three elements, a, b and c as members of the group, then for 
all a, b, and c 
a+b results a member in the group  (A 1) 
a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c   (A 2) 
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There exists a member called zero (0) such that  
a+0=0+a=a    (A 3) 
For each element a in the group there exists another element –a such that  
a+(-a)=(-a)+a=0   (A 4) 
A group is called an Abelian if addition is commutative that is 
a+b=b+a    (A 5) 
If we add another operation that is called multiplication, then with the 
following properties a ring is defined 
A 6. Closure under multiplication 
A 7. Associativity of multiplication 
A 8. Distributive low 
As previous consider a, b, c elements of a ring then for all a, b, and c 
ab is a member of the ring  (A 6) 
a(bc)=(ab)c    (A 7) 
a(b+c)=ab+ac and (a+b)c=ac+bc (A 8) 
A ring is commutative if 
ab=ba      (A9) 
With theaddition of a multiplicative inverse and the no zero divisions, an 
Integral domain is constructed 
There exists a member called (one) such that  
a1=1a=a    (A10) 
if ab=0 then either a=0 or b =0 
Finally a Field is an integral domain with the existence of a multiplicative 
inverse for all elements  except zero 
If a≠0 then there exists an element a-1 such that 
aa-1=a-1a=1    (A11) 
If the elements of the field are finite, then the field is called a finite field. 
There are lot of finite fields, but a class of them of importance to 
cryptography are the Galois Fields named after Evariste Galois and noted 
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as GF. Galois Fields are finite fields of integers that all the mathematical 
operations mentioned above are done in a modular fashion. 
B.2.2 Modular Arithmetic 
First let us introduce modular arithmetic 
Given integers a, b, n≠0, a is congruent to b modulo n. written as a≡n b, if 
and only if a-b=kn for some integer k. 
For example 19≡4 3 as 19-3=16=4*4. 
For any integer n≠0, all the element {0,1,……,n-1} are called the set of 
residues modulo n. 
Also a≡n b if and only if a mod n = b mod n 
Integers modulo n with addition and multiplication forms a commutative 
ring as described earlier. 
The addition and multiplication mathematical operations can be done 
modulo n by applying the normal operation and reducing the result by 
taking the remainder of dividing by n. 
B2.2.1 .Divisors 
A non-zero number b divides a if for some m have a=mb where a,b, and 
m are all integers. Or in another words, b divides into a with no 
remainder. This is denoted as b|a and pronounced b divides a or b is a 
divisor of a. For example 1,2,3,4,6,8,12,24 divide 24 
The set of all numbers that divides an integer is called the set of divisors 
so for the previous example {1,2,3,4,6,8,12,24} is the set of divisors of 
24. 
Modular Arithmetic is some what a 'clock arithmetic' which uses a finite 
number of values, and loops back from either end. 
As mentioned before, modular arithmetic can be done in the normal way 
and then reduce answer modulo the base. The reduction can be done in 
any point of the operation, ie 
 a+b mod n = [a mod n + b mod n] mod n  
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When reducing, we "usually" want to find the positive remainder after 
dividing by the modulus. For positive numbers, this is simply the normal 
remainder. For negative numbers we have to "overshoot" (i.e. find the 
next multiple larger than the number) and "come back" (i.e. add a positive 
remainder to get the number); rather than have a "negative remainder". 
Define the set Zn to be the set of integers less than n where n is a positive 
integer that is Zn= {0, 1…, (n-1)} the following properties hold 
(a+b) mod n= (b+a) mod n 
(a X b) mod n= (b X a) mod n 
[(a+b)+c] mod n= [a+(b+c)] mod n 
[(a  X b) X c] mod n= [a X (b X c)] mod n 
[a X (b+c)] mod n= [(a X b) + (a X c)] mod n 
(a+0) mod n= a mod n 
(a X 1) mod n= a mpd n 
For a   Zn there exists and element b   Zn such that 
a + b mod n= 0 mod n 
Table B.1 shows the addition operation mod 6 and table B.2 shows the 
multiplication operation mod 6 while table B.3 shows the additive 
inverses and the available multiplicative inverses. 
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 2 3 4 5 0 
2 2 3 4 5 0 1 
3 3 4 5 0 1 2 
4 4 5 0 1 2 3 
5 5 0 1 2 3 4 
Table B.1 Addition modulo 6 
X 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 0 2 4 0 2 4 
3 0 3 0 3 0 3 
4 0 4 2 0 4 2 
5 0 5 4 3 2 1 
Table B.2 Multiplication modulo 6 
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a -a a-1 
0 0 - 
1 5 1 
2 4 - 
3 3 - 
4 2 - 
5 1 5 
Table B.3 Inverses modulo 6 
B.2.3 Greatest Common Divisors and Inverses  
Modular arithmetic as shown above on finite integers modulo n is not a 
field in general as multiplicative inverse is not always available. It can be 
shown that a multiplicative inverse of a number a modulo nm exists if and 
only if a and n are relatively prime, that is if they exist no number that 
divides both of a and n. 
If an integer divides two other integers, it is called a common divisor. The 
largest divisor of two integers is called the grates common divisor of the 
two numbers. The greatest common divisor of two numbers can be found 
based on the Euclidian theory that is  
GCD(a,b) = GCD(b, a mod b)  
So an algorithm can be constructed to calculate the greatest common 
divisor of two numbers as follows, 
GCD(a,b) 
begin 
A=a, B=b 
while B>0 do  
begin 
R = A mod B 
A = B, B = R 
  end 
return A 
end 
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Euclid's Algorithm is derived from the observation that if a and b have a 
common factor d (i.e. a=m.d and b=n.d) then d is also a factor in any 
difference between them, a-p.b = (m.d)-p.(n.d) = d.(m-p.n). Euclid's 
Algorithm keeps computing successive differences until it vanishes, at 
which point that divisor has been reached. Following is an example of 
applying the algorithm 
Find GCD(1512,797) 
GCD(1512,797)=GCD(797,1512%797)=GCD(797,715) 
GCD(797,715)=GCD(715,797%715)=GCD(715,82) 
GCD(715,82)=GCD(82,715%82)=GCD(82,59) 
GCD(82,59)=GCD(59,82%59)=GCD(59,23) 
GCD(59,23)=GCD(23,59%23)=GCD(23,13) 
GCD(23,13)=GCD(13,23%13)=GCD(13,10) 
GCD(13,10)=GCD(10,13%10)=GCD(10,3) 
GCD(10,3)=GCD(3,10%3)=GCD(3,1) 
GCD(3,1)=GCD(1,3%1)=GCD(1,0)=1 
Then GCD(1512,797)=1. 
An extension to the Euclidean algorithm can be performed in order to 
calculate the inverse of a modulo n. The result of the algorithm is a-1 
modulo n if GCD(a,n)=1. 
The extended Euclidean algorithm is as follows 
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EXTENDED EUCLID(n, a)     (a-1 modulo n) 
(A1, A2, A3)=(1, 0, n);  
(B1, B2, B3)=(0, 1, a) 
while (B3≠0 and B3≠1) 
begin 
Q = A3 div B3 
(T1, T2, T3)=(A1 – Q B1, A2 – Q B2, A3 – Q B3) 
(A1, A2, A3)=(B1, B2, B3) 
(B1, B2, B3)=(T1, T2, T3) 
end 
if B3 = 0 
 return A3 = gcd(n, a); no inverse 
if B3 = 1  
 return B3 = gcd(n, a); B2 = a–1 mod n 
Following is an example, 
Find 550-1 modulo 1759 
Q A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 
- 1 0 1759 0 1 550 
3 0 1 550 1 -3 109 
5 1 -3 109 -5 16 5 
21 -5 16 5 106 339 4 
1 106 -339 4 -111 355 1 
Then 550-1 modulo 1759 = 355 
B.2.4 Galois Fields 
From the previous discussion, Zn can be a field if all elements of ring 
have a multiplicative inverse. This is only possible if n is a prime. In that 
case Zp where p is prime is a field and is called Galois Field of P or 
GF(P). 
Also Galois proposed a field on the form of GF(pn) where p is also a 
prime and n is an integer can also be a field if the elements of the field are 
treated as polynomials not as integers. Where each element is presented as 
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a successive power summation of elements in Zp and n-1 denotes the 
largest degree a polynomial can have. That is each number can be a 
polynomial in the form 
01
1
1 ....)( axaxaxaxf
m
m
m
m 

  where 1 nm  and Zpai   for all 
0<i<m 
In the case of GF(p) where n=1, normal modular arithmetic can be 
performed and p is the modulus.  
But in GF(pn) and n>1, another modulus has to be found. In this case an 
irreducible polynomial of degree n is used as the modulus. That is a 
polynomial that can not be factorized into a product of lower degree 
polynomials. For example X8+1 is an irreducible polynomial of degree 8. 
Polynomial arithmetic is instead used and all the results are reduce 
modulo the irreducible polynomial. Euclidean algorithm and extended 
Euclidean algorithm are applicable in the case of polynomials. The major 
field of interest in cryptography is the GF(2n) as binary numbers, normal 
representation of digital data inside a computer, can be interpreted as 
polynomials in this field. 
Consider the following example 
Get {15}-1 in GF(28) with the irreducible polynomial x8+x4+x3+x+1 
Here the number 15 is considered as a polynomial in the field GF(28) that 
is a polynomial of successive power summation of elements in Z2. This 
can be simply achieved by getting the binary representation of 15 as an 8 
bits number, that is 00001111. This presentation can be converted into a 
polynomial for as x3+x2+x+1. Now using extended Euclidean algorithm  
 
Q A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 
- 1 0 x8+x4+x3+x+1 0 1 x3+x2+x+1 
x5+x4+1 0 1 x3+x2+x+1 1 x5+x4+1 x2 
x+1 1 x5+x4+1 x2 x+1 x6+x4+x x+1 
x+1 x+1 x6+x4+x x+1 x2 x7+x6+x2+x+1 1 
Then the multiplicative inverse is {11000111}={199} 
To show how the first Q is calculated 
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Consider the following long division of polynomials 
x3+x2+x+1 x8+               x4+x3+      x+1 
x5+x4+1 x8+x7+x6+x5                          (subtracting in Z2) 
      x7+x6+x5+x4+x3+     x+1 
      x7+x6+x5+x4                     (subtracting in Z2) 
                            x3+     x+1 
                            x3+x2+x+1  (subtracting in Z2) 
                                 x2 
So the result of division is x5+x4+1 while the remainder is x2 
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  مستخلص
 أيمن محمد بهاء الدين صادق البصال
 المعلومات في أمانالنظم الذكية 
 وراةدكترسالة 
 3003 كلية الهندسة –جامعة عين شمس 
تهدف الاسالة لاسخردام النظم الذكية لخوسيع وتحسين الأداء والأمان لطاق الخشفيا الحاليتة والختي 
 تمخبا الُكون الائيسي في تحقيق أمان الُملومات.
شتا  . ثتم تخبتع كلت  تبدأ الاستالة ددراستة لداتداف الُطلتوق تحقيقهتا للومتو  لأمتان الُملومتات
مفصل لنظم الخشفيا الُخُاثلة حيث تخم عاض مبادئ الخصُيم وكيفية قياس مدى أمن نظتام تشتفيا 
 ممين. دمد كل  تماض الاسالة لمدد من الأمثلة لنظم الخشفيا الحدتثة الأكثا اسخرداما.
وكيفيتة تصتنيفها ثتم تخبتع كلت  شتا  تفصتيلي تماض الاسالة دمد كل  طاق مهاجُة نظم الخشتفيا 
 .البينيةالهجوم الخفارقية ونظم الهجوم  لنظم
 الجينية كوسيلة لُهاجُة نظم الخشفيا الُخُاثلة. تثم تماض الاسالة لإطار اسخردام الروارزميا
الجينيتة وتتم اقختاا  استخردام  تتم اقخاا  توسيع جدتد لنظم الهجوم الخفارقية داسخردام الروارزميا
ا كأداة لقياس الُلائُة. تم دمد كلت  تنفيتذ الهجتوم الُقختا  الرواص الخفارقية الُحخُلة لنظام الخشفي
عل  النُاك  الأساسية لنظم الخشفيا الُخُاثلة الحدتثة ددلا من تنفيذاا عل  نظام تشفيا دمينت  وكلت  
 لإثبات إمكانية تنفيذ الخقنية الُقخاحة عل  أي نظام تشفيا مماض للهجوم دالنظم الخفارقية.
جدتد عل  نظتم الخشتفيا الُخُاثلتة تمخُتد علت  قتدرة الشتبكات المصتبية علت  تم اقخاا  نظام اجوم 
الانخقا  من مدى لُجا  مقادل محكومتا ددالتة محتددة.  وقتد تتم تنفيتذ الهجتوم وتجادخت  علت   تقاتب
 أو الرطية. نظام تشفيا مقخا  لا تُكن حل  داسخردام النظم الخفارقية
وكلت   كُحتور لنظتام الخشتفياد علت  الشتبكات المصتبية تم دمد كل  اقخاا  نظام تشتفيا جدتتد تمخُت
لقدرتها عتل القيتام دخحقيتق مقادلتة دتين متدخلات ومراجتات كبيتاة الحجتم دتأداء ماتفتع وداستخردام 
مساحة مغياة من الذاكاة مقارنة دطاتقة جداو  الخمتوت . وقتد تتم اقختاا  نظتام لخوليتد الُفتاتي  
وقد تم عاض اقختااحين لخنفيتذ شتبكة  م الخشفيا الكامل.الفاعية من الُفخا  الأملي كجزء من نظا
 عصبية تمخُد عل  مفخا  الخشفيا لزتادة أمان النظام.
اذا وقد تم تدعيم الُقخاحات الُقدمة دواسطة عدد كبيا متن الخجتارق وتتم عتاض النختائف كتل فتي 
 موقم 
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   كرـــــش
 
 أولا وقبل كل شئ أحُد الله المظيم عل  عون  وتوفيق 
 
أود أن أعبا عن عُيق امخناني وشكاي لأسخاكي أ.د. عبد الُنمم  وادان وكلت  لاقخااحت  نقطتة ثم 
ن أعبتا عتن مااجمة الاسالة. ولا تُكننتي أأثناء إعداد والبحث ونصائح  الغالية ومجهوده المظيم 
شكاي ل  عل  رعاتخ  وااخُام  دي منذ أن كنت طالبتا دالقستم  ولا تُكتن أن أنست  أنتا أو زملائتي 
توجيهاتت  الُستخُاة لنتا. لقتد كتان ختلا  الستنوات الختي عُلتت دهتا مميتدا ثتم مدرستا مستاعدا دقستم 
ممتتة. شتتكاا اندستتة الحاستتبات والتتنظم متتثلا أعلتت  وقتتدوة تخُثتتل فيتت  الُمنتت  الحقيقتتي لأستتخاك الجا
قتد أعطتاني الفامتة كاملتة لُجهوده الُخوامل ومن قبل أثنتاء إشتااف  علت  رستالخي للُاجستخيا فل
. كتل متا أتُنتاه أن أستخطيع أن لإظهار إمكانياتي ووضع أولت  خطتواتي فتي طاتتق البحتث الملُتي
 أتبع خطاه. 
 
ء إعتداد الاستالة منتذ أن كُا أود أن أشكا أ.د. محُد أدتب رتاض الغنيُي  لُجهودات  المظيُة أثنا
كانتتت مجتتاد أفكتتار واقخااحتتات. أود أن أشتتكاه علتت  دعُتت  ومستتاعدت  وإعطتتائي الُتتواد الملُيتتة 
 والُااجع الهامة.
 
اندستة الحاستبات والتنظم أولا علت  كتل متا علُتوني فالف تل  ذتي  متن قستماتكُا أود أن أشكا أس
 وتشجيمهم   جُيع زملائي عل  دعُهموكذل دعُهم رعاتخهم و عل  تمود إليهم فيُا تملُخ  ثم 
 
دعائهم وتشتجيمهم أثنتاء إعتداد كُا أود أن أشكا والدي ووالدتي ووالدة زوجخي وجُيع أالي عل  
 .الاسالة
 
أخياا أود أن أشكا زوجخي الحبيبة عل  مبااا و دعُها الكامل وتشجيمها في أام مااحل إعتداد 
 الاسالة
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